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INTRODUCTION
When Congress outlawed employment discrimination in Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 it neither specified a par-
ticular definition of discrimination,2 nor articulated a clear
conception of the equality3 it hoped to secure for those groups
protected by the Act.4 Congress conceived of the goals of the leg-
islation in broad terms, however, and these goals were exceedingly
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
2. The basic prohibitory provisions of Title VII, sections 703(a)(1) and
703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1976), reprinted infra text accompanying
note 94, are cast in general terms and do not provide a precise definition of the dis-
crimination encompassed by the Act. See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 304.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 60-62, discussing the differing conceptions
of equality that underlie the two basic theories of liability under Title VII.
4. Title VII outlaws discrimination against an individual on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976). Discrimi-
nation based on religion presents unique legal questions and will not be addressed in
tjiis article. For convenience, the terms "minority group member" and "minorities"
are used in this Article to refer to women and to individuals belonging to racial and
ethnic groups that have historically been subjected to discriminatory treatment, in-
cluding blacks and Hispanics. Treating discrimination against women and certain
ethnic and racial minorities together makes economic sense. Economist Lester
Thurow classifies three ethnic groups-blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians-as
"economic minorities" based on their relatively poor economic standing compared to
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ambitious. Congress sought to improve the lot of traditionally
victimized minorities both by eliminating blatant injustices stem-
ming from intentional discrimination and by creating employ-
ment opportunities that would provide the economic power to
propel these groups into the mainstream of American society.5
Equality in the workplace was heralded not only as a boon for
minority members but as a potent device to improve the nation's
economy by cleansing the labor market of distortions wrought by
unjust discrimination. 6
Although the change in the American workplace that would
inevitably occur by eliminating race and sex discrimination must
have been recognized as enormous even in 1964, proponents of
the Act provided assurances that the traditional prerogatives of
management would be left undisturbed to the greatest extent pos-
sible.7 The eradication of discrimination would in the end be
good for business and would not unduly involve the government
in private decision making. Not unexpectedly, the implementa-
tion of Title VII has uncovered profound tensions by attempting
simultaneously to wipe out discrimination while minimally dis-
rupting private decision making.
The tension is most striking in what is known as "disparate
impact cases" in which an employer is charged with unintentional
discrimination.8 Of fundamental importance in the implementa-
other ethnic groups. The other major economic minority, based on Thurow's analy-
sis, is women. L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 184-87 (1980).
Entities subject to Title VII's proscriptions are employers, employment agencies,
labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to 2(d) (1976).
For convenience, this Article refers only to employers.
5. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPS. MCCUL-
LOCH, LINDSAY, CAHILL, SHRIVER, MACGREGOR, MATHIAS AND BROMWELL, H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 914],
reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 2122, 2147-51 [hereinafter cited as EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
See also S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1964). The legislative history of
Title VII is discussed infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text. For more compre-
hensive treatment of Title VII legislative history, see Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair
Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465 (1968);
Vaas, Title VI" Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966); Blum-
rosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination, and Legislative Intent-
the Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99, 117-32 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept]
6. "There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that permitting people to be
hired on the basis of their qualifications not only helps business, but also improves the
total national economy." 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3107 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
7. H.R. REP. No. 914, at 29, reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 5, at 2150. See also infra text accompanying note 242.
8. For discussion of disparate impact theory, see infra text accompanying notes
72-89, 143-93.
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tion of Title VII has been the emergence under administrative and
judicial guidance of two major techniques for avoiding Title VII
disparate impact liability. The policy 9 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other federal agencies re-
sponsible for promoting equality in the work force generally al-
lows an employer to protect itself from government initiated suits
challenging unintentional discrimination either by engaging in af-
firmative action' 0 or by validating" any hiring or promotion
method that has a disparate impact' 2 on minorities.
9. See the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, issuedjointly in 1978 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Civil Service
Commission, Department of Justice, and Department of Labor. 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1978). The Uniform Guidelines have also been adopted by the Department of the
Treasury for use in its revenue sharing program with state and local governments. 31
C.F.R. § 51.53(b) (1983). The development of the federal enforcement agencies' pol-
icy is discussed infra text accompanying notes 198-209.
10. The term "affirmative action" generally has been used to describe the use of
race-conscious plans or policies designed to advance the employment status of minor-
ities or to overcome the effects of past or present discrimination. See EEOC Affirma-
tive Action Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) ("Affirmative action ... means those
actions appropriate to overcome the effects of past or present practices, policies, or
other barriers to equal employment opportunity"); Belton, Discrimination andAffirma-
tive Action." An Ana ysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L.
REV. 531, 534-35 (1981) ("[Alffirmative action ... goes beyond the mere adoption of
a passive, prospective, nondiscriminatory principle and focuses on active implementa-
tion of specific race-conscious remedies that are designed to promote the status or
number of discriminatees in a given setting").
11. The concept of validation "involves the establishment of the relationship be-
tween a test instrument or other selection procedure and performance on the job."
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, Supplementary Information,
43 Fed. Reg. 38,290, 38,291 (1978). In Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse
Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17, 18, Professor Lerner defines
validation as: "the scientific way of determining whether a selection device actually
does what it is intended to do: to make reliable and meaningful distinctions between
individuals on the basis of their ability to perform particular tasks with competence
and/or to function successfully in particular jobs." See also Green, A Primer of Test-
ing, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1001, 1006-07 (Oct. 1981). The Uniform Guidelines have
approved three methodological approaches to validation: (1) criterion-related validity
using empirical data showing that the selection procedure is predictive of or signifi-
cantly correlated with important elements of job performance; (2) content validity us-
ing data showing that the content of a selection procedure, often a test, is
representative of important aspects of job performance, e.g., a typing test for a typing
job; and (3) construct validity using data showing that the selection procedure meas-
ures the degree to which candidates possess characteristics that have been determined
to be important for successful job performance, such as leadership ability. Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1596, 1607.5(B),
1607.16(D)-(F) (1983).
12. The courts have never endorsed a unitary statistical definition of adverse im-
pact or effect. Determining the proper methods to measure and prove adverse group
impact has given rise to a host of difficult legal and statistical questions, see infra note
317, including the bottom line controversy addressed in this Article. The federal en-
forcement agencies in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
have embraced what is known as the "4/5ths" rule orthe 80% rule, as a practical rule
of thumb to determine adverse impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1983). Under the
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The EEOC policy requires that employers discontinue use of
selection procedures, such as hiring tests, that have an adverse ef-
fect on minority groups, unless such devices have been validated
in accordance with professionally accepted methods.' 3 As an al-
ternative to validation, however, the employer may choose to im-
plement an affirmative action plan' 4 that eliminates the adverse
impact on minorities caused by the unvalidated selection device.
Thus, validation and affirmative action each serve as a compliance
technique by which the employer discharges its statutory obliga-
tion to provide equal job opportunities.
While these two compliance techniques are neither incompat-
ible nor mutually exclusive, they do reflect differing orientations
towards achieving the statutory goal of equality in employment
for protected groups. Affirmative action focuses on expanding job
benefits for previously excluded groups in the relatively short run
and achieving adequate representation of these groups in all em-
ployment sectors. Validation, on the other hand, centers on elimi-
nating employment practices and policies perceived as illegitimate
because they are not sufficiently related to successful job perform-
ance or other business exigencies to justify their adverse impact on
minorities.
At first blush, affirmative action appears to require decision
makers to be color conscious, while validation seems to be a
method for enforcing color blindness. In fact, the direction of the
two techniques cannot be so sharply contrasted and may be distin-
guished only by more subtle differences in the operation of each
technique. Both techniques are consciously designed to upgrade
4/5ths rule, as applied in the Guidelines, the rates of hire or promotion of minorities
are compared to the rates for non-minorities. If the minority rate is less than 80% of
the non-minority rates, adverse impact is deemed established. For more detailed ex-
planations of the operation of the 4/5ths rule, see Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Con-
cept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept]; Note, The Uniform Guide-
lines on Employee Selection Procedures: Compromises and Controversies, 28 CATH.
U.L. REV. 605, 627-30 (1979).
The 4/5ths rule, like the bottom line focus it incorporates, has been the subject of
controversy. Criticism can be found in C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS,
FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.5, at 48-51 (1980),
and Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing.- Statistical Proof
Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978). For a defense of the 4/5ths rule, see
Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept, supra, at 12-20.
For more comprehensive treatment of the difficulties in determining adverse im-
pact in disparate impact cases, see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF
DISCRIMINATION § 2.23 (1980); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW 318-30 (1983).
13. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, Supplementary In-
formation, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,920, 38,921 (1978), explains the interaction between the
two compliance techniques of validation and affirmative action.
14. Id.
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the status of minorities in the workplace beyond simply assuring
that decisionmaking is untainted by racial bias.' 5 To accomplish
this overall objective, affirmative action seeks to achieve "substan-
tive" equality, measured principally in terms of numbers of jobs
and other employment benefits secured by minorities.16 The pro-
cess-oriented technique of "validating" certain employment prac-
tices that produce group adverse impact, on the other hand, is
more closely allied with an ideal of "merit selection" that relegates
equality of results to a beneficial by-product of fair procedures.
Predictably, each technique has had its critics. For example,
the current Administration has taken a strong stand against af-
firmative action, claiming that a direct effort to create employment
opportunities for certain protected groups "needlessly creates a
caste system in which an individual must be unfairly disadvan-
taged for each person who is preferred. . .[and] inevitably intro-
duce[s] a divisive influence into the work place, the community,
and the country as a whole."' 17 In contrast, opponents of valida-
tion as the exclusive compliance technique fear that, without the
additional, direct creation of employment opportunities afforded
by affirmative action, an "impenetrable" barrier to the basic ob-
jective of the advancement of minorities could remain.' Affirma-
tive action is thus criticized as being unfair, validation as
inadequate.
The 1964 Congress understandably gave little thought to any
theoretical tension that might exist between the goals of achieving
equality in the distribution of jobs through affirmative action-so-
called "bottom line" equality-and that of "validating" employ-
ment practices and policies to produce economic benefits for all. 19
15. For discussion of validation as a technique that is tied to a group-oriented
conception of equality, see infra text accompanying notes 292-313.
16. Not all affirmative action efforts directly produce an increase in the number
of minorities or women who secure jobs or receive other employment benefits. For
example, an affirmative action recruiting program may consist only of attempts to
expand the pool of applicants in the hope that more minority members will ultimately
be selected. Even if such hope is unrealized, the effort may nevertheless be aptly
designated as an affirmative action plan. This Article focuses, however, on those af-
firmative action plans that are used by the employer as a basis for making employ-
ment decisions. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.2(C) (1983) (affirmative action recruiting plans are not "selection pro-
cedures" subject to Guidelines).
17. Address by William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant United States Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, The Fourth Annual Conference on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, "The Focus of Equal Employment Opportunity Programs Under
the Reagan Administration," at 6 (Oct. 20, 1981).
18. Comments of Eleanor Holmes Norton, Excerpts From Transcript of EEOC
Commissioners Meeting (Dec. 22, 1977), DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) No. 43, at E-4
(Mar. 3, 1978). See infra note 334.
19. In 1964, the technique of validation was in its infancy, see United States v.
H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 75-76 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (discussing cultural bias of
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It was the more conspicuous forms of intentional discrimination
that animated the legislative initiative in 1964, and, in the first
decade after Title VII's enactment occupied the energy and time
of the courts and of the EEOC.20
Now that many of the most patent abuses have been elimi-
nated, 21 the debate over the fundamental meaning of equality in
Title VII and the resulting scope of employer liability has
reemerged with renewed vigor.22 A recent significant judicial en-
try in the debate is a little celebrated 5-4 decision 23 by the
Supreme Court that, curiously, finds the liberal members of the
Court24 on the side of validation, and the traditionally conserva-
aptitude tests and techniques of test validation); 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION § 75.23 (1983); Wigdor, Psychological Testing and the Law of
Employment Discrimination, in ABILITY TESTING: USES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CON-
TROVERSIES, Part II, at 39, 61 (1982), and the concept of group interests reflected in
the bottom line principle was not fully developed. Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in
Employment after Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Blumrosen, Affirmative Action]; Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, supra note 5,
at 108-10. Little of the current terminology associated with validation and the bottom
line principle can be found in the Title VII legislative history dealing with ability
testing. 110 CONG. REC. 7247, 9024-25, 11,251, 13,492-13,505, 13,724, reprinted in
EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3129-63.
20. During the first 10 years of Title VII's operation, the vast majority of charges
filed with the EEOC sought individual relief in connection with an intentionally dis-
criminatory discharge, failure to hire, or failure to promote. Blumrosen, Strangers No
More.- All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 519, 525 (1978). Indeed, it is not impossible to find examples of current
cases that involve egregious forms of intentional discrimination. Eg., Hatton v. Ford
Motor Co. (E.D. Mich. 1981) (black male plaintiff subjected to cruelty and scorn of
racist supervisors suffered consequent stroke and other physical harm); Segar v. Civi-
letti, (D.D.C. 1981) (black DEA agents more often given undercover assignments
than white agents); O'Connell v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 313 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (employer permitted male but not female adjusters and supervisors to attend
law school).
21. "The overt and blatant bigotry that marked the leading civil rights cases of an
earlier year seldom supplies the gravamen of cases which now reach the appellate
courts." Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
See also General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 412 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept, supra note 12, at 1-2.
22. See, e.g., Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action, supra note 10, at 531;
Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra note 19, at 11-14; Brodin, The Standard of Cau-
sation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action." A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 292 (1982); Lerner, Employment Discrimination.- Adverse Impact, Validity, and
Equality, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 17; Meltzer, The Weber Case.- The JudicialAbrogation
of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980);
Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable
Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1980); Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of Redistributing
Injustice.- A Critical View of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber and the Mis-
guided Policy of Numerical Employment, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1979).
23. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The Teal decision is also discussed
infra text accompanying notes 29-37 & 229-46.
24. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
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tive members25 on the side of the bottom line principle, despite
that principle's heavy reliance on affirmative action.
The bottom line principle is relevant in a relatively small, but
conceptually critical, class of cases26 in which an inconsistency ex-
ists between the predictable effect of a challenged practice or pol-
icy and the actual pattern of hiring or other personnel practices in
the defendant's workplace. In these bottom line cases, use of a
selection device that would normally result in a lower hiring or
promotion rate of minorities does not, in fact, have such an exclu-
sionary effect. The minority group as a whole is not disadvan-
taged in these cases because other selection procedures, either
intentionally designed, 27 or operating fortuitously,28 offset the ex-
pected adverse impact. Despite the offset, however, individual mi-
nority members may still claim to be victims of discrimination if
they have been excluded by the challenged selection procedure.
The bottom line problem arises, for example, when an em-
ployer who hires only high school graduates for a given position
decides to engage in affirmative action to offset the selection of
fewer blacks which can be anticipated as a result of the educa-
tional disqualification. The operation of the affirmative action
plan results in the hiring of a larger percentage of black applicants
with high school diplomas than white applicants with the same
degree. As a result of the affirmative action plan, the employer's
overall hiring figures reflect the percentage of blacks in the avail-
able labor force. Because the affirmative action offset does noth-
ing to aid the black applicant who has never finished high school,
however, such an applicant may still maintain that the educa-
tional requirement violates the Title VII prohibition against the
use of unjustified neutral policies that produce discriminatory ef-
fects. The critical issue thus becomes whether Title VII should
prohibit only unjustified discriminatory procedures that actually
result in the loss of employment opportunities in the defendant's
work force-the bottom line approach--or whether Title VII
25. Justice Powell wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor.
26. For additional explanations of the operation of the bottom line principle, see
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1191-93 (1976); D.
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at § 1.23 1; Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept,
supra note 12, at 4; Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects ofEmployee Selection
Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-32
(1977).
27. A bottom line balance may be achieved by the employer's conscious use of
affirmative action to offset the adverse impact of tests or other selection devices on
minorities. For discussion of the offsetting capacity of affirmative action programs,
see infra text accompanying notes 316-30.
28. For discussion of the operation of fortuitous offsetting selection devices, see
infra text accompanying note 330.
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more broadly warrants justification of any selection device that
independently has a tendency to produce discriminatory selection
patterns.
The Supreme Court rejected the bottom line principle by a
narrow margin in Connecticut v. Teal.29 Teal involved the lawful-
ness of an unvalidated written examination that state employees
were required to pass before being placed in a pool of those eligi-
ble for promotion.30 Although blacks failed the test in dispropor-
tionate numbers, 3' offsetting affirmative action efforts32 were
employed at the late stages of the promotional process. 33 This off-
setting procedure resulted in a promotion rate for blacks who had
survived the screening process far in excess of the promotion rate
for whites in the same position.34 Affirming the Second Circuit, 35
the Supreme Court refused to accord any weight to the bottom
line promotion results and held that the existence of an appropri-
ate racial representation 36 in defendant's ultimate selections
would neither prevent plaintiff from establishing its prima facie
case of adverse impact, nor provide a defense to the employer.37
29. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The case was decided 5-4. For a listing of the Justices
in the majority and dissent, see supra notes 24-25.
30. The plaintiffs in Teal were four black female employees of the Department of
Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut, who had been promoted provision-
ally to the position of supervisor. Plaintiffs sought to attain permanent status as
supervisors after working in that capacity. The first step in attaining a permanent
position was to secure a passing score on a written examination. Plaintiffs failed the
exam and were not allowed to continue in the selection process. 457 U.S. at 442-44.
31. The passage rate for black candidates was 54.17%; the rate for white candi-
dates was 79.54%. Id. at 443 n.4.
32. In its brief before the Supreme Court, the State of Connecticut belatedly de-
nied that it had implemented any affirmative action program in connection with the
promotion process. The state claimed that the promotion process was based solely on
merit and qualifications, as apparently required by state law. Brief for Petitioners at 4
n.1, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The Court of Appeals, however, had
characterized defendant's post-exam procedures as "affirmative action" designed to
insure that a significant number of minority members were promoted to supervisors,
Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1981), a 'd sub nom. 457 U.S. 440
(1982), and the disproportionately high selection rate of minorities is understandable
only as a product of affirmative action. The Supreme Court, however, found no need
to resolve the dispute, rejecting the bottom line principle even when the employer had
admittedly engaged in affirmative action to produce a balanced overall result. Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 444 & n.5.
33. The plaintiffs filed suit five months after taking and failing the written exami-
nations. More than a year after the suit was filed, defendant made the promotions
from an eligibility list generated by the written examination. 457 U.S. at 444.
34. Of the blacks who participated in the selection process, 22.9% were promoted;
only 13.5% of the white candidates were promoted. Id. at 444.
35. 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), aft'd sub nom. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
36. An examination of the applicant flow data, presented in Teal, 457 U.S. at 443
n.4, shows that the number of blacks finally selected for the supervisory positions was
more than sufficient to counteract the disparate impact of the written exam. The pro-
motion rate for blacks was close to 170% of that for whites. Id. at 444 n.6.
37. Id. at 452.
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Despite its apparent interventionist posture on behalf of mi-
nority interests, 38 Teal ultimately may not prove to be a victory
for civil rights advocates. The majority's willingness in Teal to
allow the fair procedure concerns of individual minority workers
to undermine the employer's successful affirmative action efforts
conflicts with the tenor of the Court's earlier landmark decision in
United Steelworkers v. Weber,3 9 which had greatly encouraged
voluntary affirmative action plans by employers.
By requiring even "affirmative action" employers to validate
their tests or be subject to liability for unintentional discrimina-
tion, Teal reduces the incentive for employers to engage in affirm-
ative action.4° The strength of the disincentive resulting from
Teal's insistence on validation is an empirical question that may
be definitively answered only by a greater understanding of the
reasons employers engage in affirmative action.4' However, any
incentive employers may have had prior to Teal to implement af-
firmative action plans to shield their use of unvalidated, objective
selection devices has now been eliminated. At the same time, Teal
elevates validation to a preferred status, making it the sole compli-
ance technique that provides employers with complete immunity
from disparate impact claims. 42
The overall objective of this Article is to assess the relative
priority that should be given to achieving "bottom line" equality
and to encouraging use of "valid," nondiscriminatory employ-
ment procedures. The relative efficacy 43 of the two approaches is
explored as well as the implications of such a value choice on the
scope of permissible management prerogatives. 44 The Article crit-
icizes the Court's disapproval of the bottom line approach in Teal
because such outright rejection is hard to reconcile fully with the
balancing of values that might be thought implicit in the disparate
impact theory of liability and is not otherwise justified by policy
considerations.
To understand and critique the Court's decision in Teal, it is
38. Civil rights groups have generally disapproved of the bottom line principle
and have endorsed a requirement of validation of individual selection components.
See, e.g., Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7-10, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982);
Brief of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae
at 2-4, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
39. 443 U.S. 193 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 889 (1979). Weber is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 248-54.
40. For a fuller discussion of the effect of Teal on affirmative action, see infra text
accompanying notes 314-32.
41. Id.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 229-62.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 314-40.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 341-46.
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necessary preliminarily to analyze in considerable depth the
Court's views of the equality guarantee of Title VII. Thus, Part I
explains the differences between the two judicially recognized the-
ories of liability under Title VII-the disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact theories.45  It examines how two such divergent
theories evolved, especially given the differences in the conception
of equality which each seems to reflect. 46
Part II explores the conceptions of equality that Title VII em-
bodies through an analysis of the "bottom line" cases. 47 These
cases highlight what should be a critical point in the development
of Title VII compliance techniques. The point is that the dispa-
rate impact theory of liability cannot be fully explained without
accepting the conclusion that some group-oriented conception of
equality is appropriate under Title VII. Yet such a group concep-
tion of equality is itself not exclusively associated with a single
compliance technique.48 Rather, a judicial preference for a partic-
ular compliance technique must find its justification in an assess-
ment of the likely impact that the technique will have on
employer behavior and, ultimately, on the attainment of equality
for protected groups.49 Validation as the preferred compliance
technique has not been so justified by the Supreme Court. Nor
can speculation as to the effects of the Teal decision readily supply
that justification.
I. THE DIVERGENT THEORIES OF LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
A. Disparate Treatment v. Disparate Impact
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a case of em-
ployment discrimination under Title VII may proceed under two
strikingly different, although not incompatible, theories of liabil-
ity.50 It is hornbook law that an employer not only is forbidden to
45. See infra text accompanying notes 50-I 13.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 114-93.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 194-347.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 263-313.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 314-47.
50. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977), the Supreme Court described the two theories of liability:
"Disparate treatment". . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment ...
Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress
had in mind when it enacted Title VII. ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justi-
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treat minority group members less favorably than other employ-
ees through intentionally discriminatory practices, but may also
be prohibited from using racially neutral practices or policies that
produce discriminatory effects."1 In the former, "disparate treat-
ment" case, the absence of intentional discrimination is enough to
insulate the defendant employer from liability. 52 The plaintiff
who relies on a disparate treatment theory is aided by judicially-
created evidentiary presumptions,5 3 but ultimately must establish
that he or she is a victim of intentional employer action based on
race.54 In contrast, in a disparate impact or "effects" case, a plain-
tiff need not establish an employer's intent to discriminate.5 5 In-
stead, in such cases the harm that must be justified or remedied is
the adverse impact 56 or harmful effect of neutral employment
practices on the protected group. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed the touchstone of legality in disparate impact cases as the
existence of "business necessity. ' 57 Reaching beyond intentional
unequal treatment of particular individuals, the effects test at-
tempts to eradicate all unnecessary or arbitrary barriers to equal
fled by business necessity. . . . Proof of discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory. . . .Either
theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts. [Citations
omitted.]
See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981);
Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 57, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
51. For general treatment of the two theories of liability, see D. BALDUS & J.
COLE, supra note 12, at § 1.2; D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 9.6-.7
(2d ed. 1980); 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, at § 65.00; B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 1-12; C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra
note 12, at §§ 1.6-.7.
52. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 & n.18 (1973).
53. See discussion of allocation of burden of persuasion and production in dispa-
rate treatment cases infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
54. Title VII does not allow employers to justify any explicit disparate treatment
based on race. Section 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l), however, permits an em-
ployer to hire an individual "on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise ...... The BFOQ exception does not, however, encompass
discrimination based on race or color.
55. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977); International Bhd.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1982);
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 990 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982); McKenzie v.
Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 70 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
56. For a discussion of adverse impact, see supra note 12.
57. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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employment opportunity.58 In disparate impact cases, the court
must determine whether the harmful impact of an "innocent" em-
ployer's practices on the plaintiff class justifies burdening that em-
ployer with what may be a costly remedial obligation.59
Each of the theories of liability corresponds to a recognized
conception of equality.60 The disparate treatment theory reflects
the equal treatment conception of equality. The disparate impact
theory fits well with what is known as the equal opportunity or
equal achievement conception of equality.
The equal treatment conception of equality focuses on fair-
ness to the individual and is commonly associated with a legal
command of color-blindness. The goal is to secure fair competi-
tion in which no person is disadvantaged in the quest for employ-
ment benefits because of racially biased decisionmaking. 61
In contrast, the equal opportunity or equal achievement con-
58. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
59. Successful plaintiffs in disparate impact cases are generally entitled to
backpay under § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See, e.g., Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1975) ("given a finding of unlawful dis-
crimination, back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past
discrimination," id. at 421). Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), also
provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee. ... A prevailing
plaintiff in a Title VII action ordinarily recovers attorney's fees unless special circum-
stances would make the award unjust. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978). However, compensatory or punitive damages generally are not al-
lowed. See, e.g., Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th
Cir. 1981); Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); De Grace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st
Cir. 1980).
60. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 10, at 538-42; Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237-49 (1971). Throughout this Article, references to
the dual conceptions of equality embodied in Title VII are meant to be distinguished
from references to an overall, unitary goal or concept of equality vindicated by Act.
The distinction between concept and conception is borrowed from R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-35 (1977), which gives the following helpful
example:
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others
unfairly. I no doubt have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to
discourage, but I would not accept that my "meaning" was limited to
these examples, for two reasons. First I would expect my children to
apply my instructions to situations I had not and could not have
thought about. Second, I stand ready to admit that some particular act
I had thought was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair, or vice versa, if
one of my children is able to convince me of that later; in that case I
should want to say that my instructions covered the case he cited, not
that I had changed my instructions. I might say that I meant the family
to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of
fairness I might have had in mind.
61. Belton, supra note 10, at 540; Fiss, supra note 60, at 237.
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ception of equality is a group-oriented conception that seeks to
upgrade the status and condition of protected groups by eliminat-
ing all unnecessary barriers to group advancement. Color-con-
sciousness rather than color-blindness is often required to discover
and eliminate obstacles to group advancement. Moreover, unlike
the equal treatment conception, the group-oriented equal oppor-
tunity conception, as it is typically advanced, rests on the supposi-
tion that minority groups in society will continue to suffer
disadvantages as a legacy of past discrimination, unless and until
racial stratification disappears. 62 Despite these differences, both
conceptions of equality are consistent with an ultimate ideal of
equality in which race plays no significant role in decisionmaking,
either overtly or as a reflection of a stratified society.
It follows from the distinct nature of the disparate impact the-
ory that such claims are natural candidates for class actions. 63 Al-
though also invokable by individual plaintiffs,64 disparate impact
theory, by definition, makes sense only in cases alleging discrimi-
nation against a group. It is impossible for an individual minority
worker to establish adverse impact without some evidence of the
effect of the selection device on persons other than the individual
plaintiff.65 Disparate treatment claims also may be raised by both
individual plaintiffs and in class actions. But the gravamen of the
disparate treatment action-intentional unequal treatment-may
occur in either an isolated or systematic fashion. 66 The plaintiff,
therefore, need not provide evidence of the effect of the em-
ployer's action on the group.
The leading disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green ,67 allocated the burdens of proof between the par-
ties in a manner that aided the plaintiff, yet did not erase the re-
quirement of proof of intentional discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas established a three-part test that requires plaintiff to
show prima facie (1) protected group status; (2) adverse treatment
by the employer; and (3) minimal qualifications for the job at is-
sue.68 In the hiring context of McDonnell Douglas, a presumption
62. Belton, supra note 10, at 541; Fiss, supra note 60, at 237-38.
63. Even Title VII plaintiffs alleging classwide discrimination, however, must
satisfy the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147 (1982) (disapproving the Fifth Circuit's "across-the-board" rule for Title VII class
actions that had treated racial discrimination, by definition, as class discrimination).
64. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 584-85 (4th Cir. 1979);
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Wade v. New
York Tel. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
65. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at § 1.22.
67. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
68. "The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
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of intentional discrimination arises if plaintiff is black and quali-
fied, yet the employer did not hire plaintiff for an admitted va-
cancy.69 At this juncture, the employer must articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. This is the first point at
which discriminatory intent is directly addressed.70 Finally, even
if the employer meets its burden, plaintiff still may prevail by
proving that the employer's proffered reason was simply a pretext
for intentional discrimination. 7'
The major disparate impact cases72 also provide a three-stage
procedure for the parties in litigation, but there the similarity to
the substance of disparate treatment cases ends. First, plaintiff is
required to demonstrate that defendant's practice or policy has a
group adverse impact.73 Once a plaintiff shows group harm, the
tion. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial mi-
nority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
In later cases, the Supreme Court explained why the above four elements were
sufficient to create a prima facie case of intentional discrimination:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of dis-
crimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unex-
plained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors . . . .And we are willing to presume this largely
because we know from our experience that more often than not people
do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying rea-
sons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons
for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for
the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we
generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration such as race.
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). See also Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
69. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
70. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-56; McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
71. Texas Dept of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 804-05. The term "pretext" in the disparate treatment line of cases is used
in its ordinary sense to signify an excuse masking a real, intentionally discriminatory
reason.
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the
crucial issue of discriminatory intent. Texas Dept of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at
256. Defendant's burden at the second stage of the disparate treatment case is merely
to rebut the presumption of discrimination raised by plaintiffs prima facie showing
by producing evidence that plaintiff was rejected for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason. Texas Def't of Communi Affairs, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
72. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (1982); New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975).
73. Statistics that reflect the effect of the practice on the protected group, rather
than the testimony of affected individuals, constitute the most probative evidence of
discrimination at this stage. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at § 1.231 ("Under
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employer may defend by establishing that the disputed practice or
policy is a "business necessity."'7 4 For example, in the context of a
challenge to a pre-employment test, business necessity is most
often established by evidence that the test is an adequate predictor
of an applicant's likely performance on the job.75 By thus at-
tempting to "validate" their tests as reliable predictors, employers
argue that use of such tests is justified solely by the demands of
the business.
Finally, even if an employer comes forward with sufficient
evidence of business necessity, the courts agree that plaintiff must
a disparate impact theory, statistical evidence of impact is not merely circumstantial
(as it is under the disparate treatment theory), but is direct evidence of the results
which trigger the demand for additional justification"); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON,
supra note 19, § 50.21, at 10-7. For a discussion of the methods of proving adverse
impact, see supra note 12.
74. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977), the Court defined
"business necessity" as an employment practice that is "shown to be necessary to safe
and efficient job performance." The Dothard formulation of "business necessity"
closely resembled the formulation of that defense as first enunciated in Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
See also Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo., School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 841 (10th
Cir. 1981); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
456 U.S. 273 (1982).
Several recent lower court decisions have, however, refused to apply this strin-
gent formulation of the business necessity standard. See, e.g., Contreras v. City of
Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982)
(employer need only show that practices "significantly serve, but are neither required
by, nor necessary to, the employer's legitimate business interests"); Chrisner v. Com-
plete Auto Transit, 25 F.E.P 484, 491 (6th Cir. 1981) (less justification needed when
job requires a high degree of skill and safety risks are present).
Lower courts are also in conflict over whether the defendant in a disparate im-
pact case should shoulder both the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of justification for a challenged practice that adversely affects
minorities. Compare Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 293 (1982) (once plaintiff proves its prima facie case, both the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion shift to defendant) and Kirby v.
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980), with Croker v. Boeing Co., 662
F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (plaintiff retains burden of persuasion, defend-
ant's burden is solely one of production). See Comment, Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine: The Procedural Subversion of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ?, 17
NEW ENG. L. REV. 999 (1982).
75. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47; Davis, 426 U.S. at 247; Albemarle Paper Co., 422
U.S. at 431; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-36 (1971).
Some courts have stated that even validated tests or selection devices may be
vulnerable under Title VII if there exists a feasible alternative with less discrimina-
tory impact. Eg., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1383 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912, 920-21 (E.D.
Wis. 1975), aftd, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Business Necessity.-
Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 418-19
(1981). Cf. Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A
No-AlternativeApproach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 101-02 (1974) (practice should be deemed
justified if it furthers a valid business purpose and no alternative practice with lesser
disparate impact would be as effective).
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be given an opportunity to rebut.76 The essential elements of
plaintiff's rebuttal have, however, not been settled by the courts.
One logical option is to allow the plaintiff to rebut by showing
that the defendant may use an alternative device that has less ad-
verse impact on the group.77 The logic of this less restrictive alter-
native approach is that a case of genuine necessity is not made out
if the existence of a reasonable option allows the employer to
achieve its goals with less harm to those protected by Title VII.78
Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, seem to reject
such a wide-ranging search for a less restrictive or less burden-
some alternative. The Court has indicated that the plaintiff's re-
buttal should instead focus on whether the employer is using the
concededly job-related device as a pretext for intentional
discrimination. 79
The Supreme Court's apparent willingness to allow the em-
ployer's intent to become determinative at the surrebuttal stage of
the disparate impact case has led to speculation 80 that the Court is
76. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 436.
77. Several lower courts have been reluctant to limit the scope of the plaintiff's
rebuttal in impact cases solely to the question of defendant's discriminatory intent.
These courts would permit plaintiff to rebut the business necessity defense upon proof
of an alternative, nondiscriminatory practice which would accomplish the employer's
stated objectives. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982);
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 989 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982); NAACP v.
Medical Center, 657 F.2d 1332, 1336 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981); Chrisner v. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 25
FEP 866, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. "It should go without saying that a practice is hardly 'necessary' if an alterna-
tive practice better effectuates the intended purpose or is equally effective but less
discriminatory." Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
79. Teal, 457 U.S. at 447; New York Transit Authority, 440 U.S. at 587;Albemarle
Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425. In Albemarle, the Court put quotations around the word
"pretext," thus implying that the term may not have the same ordinary meaning
found in disparate treatment cases, i.e., discriminatory intent. See C. SULLIVAN, M.
ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 59-60. In Beazer, however, the
quotations disappeared and the term was apparently used in a manner more closely
associated with actual discriminatory intent. "The District Court's express finding
that the [employer's] rule was not motivated by racial animus forecloses any claim in
rebuttal that it was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination." 440 U.S. at 587.
For a more thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of the surrebut-
tal phase of disparate impact litigation, see Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Dispa-
rate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419, 423-25 (1982); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIM-
MER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 58-60; Booth & Mackay, Legal Con-
straints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY L.J. 121,
189 n.268 (1980); Note, Business Necessity. Judicial Dualism and the Searchfor Ade-
quate Standards, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 376, 418-19 (1981).
See also supra note 77 and cases cited therein (discussing lower court's reluctance
to limit the scope of plaintiff's rebuttal to discriminatory intent).
80. Furnish, supra note 79, at 419.
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subtly merging the disparate impact and intent theories. The
merger conceivably could be accomplished by regarding a prima
facie showing of disparate impact as functioning solely to create a
presumption of intentional discrimination. 81 Such a merged the-
ory would treat the evil to be remedied in both disparate impact
and disparate treatment cases as the elimination of intentional dis-
crimination and would handily explain why a showing of "pre-
text" by the plaintiff is necessary to overcome the employer's
showing of job-relatedness or business necessity.
The case law, however, has never explicitly regarded proof of
adverse impact as a mere proxy for intentional discrimination in
disparate impact cases. 82 Rather, the opinions 3 suggest that a
showing of adverse impact performs a distinctly different function
in disparate treatment and disparate impact cases. For example,
while a certain level of statistical proof of adverse impact in a dis-
parate impact challenge may well satisfy plaintiff's burden of
proving a prima facie case of unintentional discrimination, the
same showing may not be strong enough to raise an inference of
81. Id. at 443.
82. But compare Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 264-65
(N.D. Tex. 1980), in which Judge Patrick Higginbotham espoused the view that dis-
parate impact analysis should be regarded simply as an application of equal treat-
ment philosophy. It is unclear, however, whether Higginbotham's expanded equal
treatment concept encompasses some forms of unintentional unequal treatment.
83. Since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the courts have rou-
tinely insisted that discriminatory intent is not a critical ingredient of a disparate im-
pact claim. See cases cited supra note 55. This insistence indicates that a showing of
group adverse impact in disparate impact analysis functions as direct proof of the evil
to be remedied rather than as a proxy for intentional discrimination. The U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights has described the differing function of statistics in disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases in this way:
Although both the "intent" and the "effects" standards use statisti-
cal data in determining whether illegal discrimination has occurred,
such data serve distinctly different purposes. In "intent" cases, the
courts have had to develop a variety of ways to determine whether in-
tentional discrimination exists, because few decisionmakers publicize or
otherwise expose their discriminatory intent. Primary among these is
numerical evidence of unequal results because "[i]n many cases the
only available avenue of proof is the use of. . . statistics to uncover
clandestine and covert discrimination." Other factors that may indicate
such discriminatory intent include the sequence of events leading to the
decision, abnormal procedures, the historical background of the deci-
sion, and contemporary statements by decisionmakers.
In "effects" cases, however, numerical evidence is not used to as-
sess the likelihood that the accused discriminator has intentionally
caused harm to the victim on the basis of race, national origin, or sex
because the intent of the discriminator is not determinative. In these
cases, numerical evidence emphasizes the existing unequal conditions
in our society, whether they are caused by one discriminator or many,
intentionally or not.
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s: DISMAN-
TLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (1981) (citations omitted).
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intentional discrimination in a class-wide disparate treatment
setting.84
The differing role that proof of adverse impact plays under
each theory is well illustrated by the landmark case of Washington
v. Davis .85 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected both a consti-
tutional and a statutory challenge to the use of hiring tests by the
District of Columbia's police department. With respect to the
constitutional claim, the Court held that proof of discriminatory
purpose was essential and found plaintiff's showing of adverse im-
pact insufficient to raise an inference of intentional discrimina-
tion.86 The statistical showing of adverse impact was enough,
however, to raise a prima facie inference of discrimination under
the statutory claim.87
Washington v. Davis suggests that the Court does not look
upon disparate impact analysis as a heavyhanded evidentiary de-
vice designed to ferret out intentional discrimination, but as a tool
for eliminating harmful, unjustified unintentional discrimina-
tion.88 Given the Court's continued adherence to the distinctive-
ness of the two theories of liability under Title VII, its narrowing
of the final stage of the impact case is best viewed as a device to
allow the challenger to prove intentional discrimination, should
the employer justify the alleged adverse impact to the Court's sat-
84. Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 535 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) ("lesser
degree of statistical disparity adequate to support a disparate impact action"); Wil-
liams v. City of New Orleans, 543 F. Supp. 662, 672 (E.D. La. 1982) (In a disparate
treatment case, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case "by showing a longstand-
ing and gross statistical disparity," while in a disparate impact case the plaintiff "need
only show . . . a significantly adverse statistical impact on their protected class.").
See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 12, § 1.4(c), at
22-29.
85. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
86. Id. at 246-47.
87. The statutory claim was grounded on alleged violations of civil service regu-
lations and treated by the Court as "similar to those [standards] obtaining under Title
VII." Id. at 249. Plaintiffs showed that blacks failed the challenged test four times as
often as whites. Id. at 237. Although this showing was sufficient to require justifica-
tion under disparate impact analysis, id. at 249-50, the Court held that the adverse
impact was justified, Le., that the test was sufficiently job-related to pass the "more
probing judicial review" appropriate for statutory claims. Id. at 247.
88. Although a showing of discriminatory intent is essential to finding an equal
protection violation in a suit against a public employer, see infra note 102, this re-
quirement ought not to influence the determination of the nature of the right pro-
tected by Title VII disparate impact theory. Congress is empowered under the
Commerce Clause, and perhaps Section 5 of the 14th amendment as well, to prohibit
public employers from using unjustified neutral policies or practices that have a dis-
criminatory effect. Cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (Mar. 2, 1983) (exten-
sion of Age Discrimination in Employment Act to cover state and local governments
is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power); see generally Jacobs, A
Constitutional Route to Discriminatory Impact Statutory Liability for State and Local
Government Employers.- All Roads Lead to Rome, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 301 (1980).
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isfaction.89 Under this view, the pretext phase of the impact case
functions only to insure against the relatively rare case of employ-
ers attempting to use theoretically "necessary" practices to accom-
plish intentionally discriminatory objectives. Thus, the Court's
refusal to endorse a more wide-ranging search for alternatives
may be explained satisfactorily without deviating radically from
the traditional view of the distinctiveness of the two theories.
B. Legislative Basesfor the Dual Theory Approach
Although the Supreme Court opinions continue to endorse
both the disparate treatment and impact methods for proving dis-
crimination under Title VII, they have not yet yielded a full expla-
nation of how the differing approaches together contribute to the
equality objectives underlying Title VII. Most significantly, the
Court has not elaborated on why intent is the cornerstone of the
disparate treatment case,90 yet unnecessary to a finding of discrim-
ination under disparate impact theory.91 The coexistence of the
two theories, absent a recognized justification for the differences,
may mean either that the theories are separately designed to im-
plement two differing conceptions of equality or that the theories
are simply distinct methods for enforcing a single conception of
equality. A fully satisfactory answer does not readily emerge
from either the statutory language or the legislative history sur-
rounding Title VII. These sources do, however, tend to support
two distinct conceptions of equality which may be paired with the
two theories of liability.92
89. The Fourth Circuit has recently adopted this view of the surrebuttal stage of
the impact case:
The Supreme Court's recognition in Albemarle Paper and Beazer that
following prima facie proof and prima facie avoidance of a disparate
impact claim, a claimant can yet prove discriminatory treatment by
showing "pretext" in the challenged practice simply reaffirms the
Court's consistent admonition that both theories may appropriately be
applied as alternative bases of recovery on the same set of facts.
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1192 n.31 (4th Cir. 1982). See also NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1354 n.22 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting):
[Aibermarle] can be read as simply acknowledging that plaintiffs who
failed to prove a Griggs-type violation, could nonetheless still attempt
to succeed on an intent theory if they were prepared to prove that less
discriminatory alternatives existed and that, therefore, defendant's jus-
tification was merely pretextual, 422 U.S. at 425, 95 S. Ct. at 2375. This
use of alternatives as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus
is standard in intentional discrimination cases.
90. For a discussion of the importance of the employer's intent in disparate treat-
ment cases, see infra text accompanying notes 114-42.
91. For a discussion of why a finding of discriminatory intent is unnecessary in
disparate impact cases, see infra text accompanying notes 143-93.
92. For a discussion of the two conceptions of equality, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 60-62.
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The language of Title VII itself broadly prohibits discrimina-
tion without attempting to define the concept in precise terms.
The basic provisions, Sections 703(a)(1) and (2),93 make it unlaw-
ful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, or as an appli-
cant for employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.94
On its face, the language is capable of supporting both dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact theories.95 The critical statu-
tory phrase "because of," delimiting the kinds of discrimination
that are actionable, is ambiguous. Although the phrase might be
thought to connote intentionality, the language denotes only a
causal relationship between an enumerated characteristic and the
challenged action.96 A faithful reading of the language, then,
could encompass wholly unintentional adverse treatment in which
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1976). The only change made by the 1972
amendments to this section was the inclusion of the phrase "or applicants for employ-
ment" in Section 703(a)(2). Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 107 (1972).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1976).
95. At first glance, the references in Sections 703(a)(1) and (2) to "any individ-
ual" might suggest that the focus should be on individual rather than group harm and
thus seem more compatible with a claim of disparate treatment than one of disparate
impact. But it is also reasonable to interpret the language as forbidding certain disad-
vantageous effects on protected groups, at ,least insofar as such harm ultimately de-
scends upon individuals. Cf. Teal, 457 U.S. at 458-59 (Powell, dissenting); Furnco
Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 581-82 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (for the argument that individual rights are protected under Section 703(a)(2) by
permitting an individual plaintiff to prevail upon a showing that a policy operates
simultaneously as a barrier to the plaintiffs own advancement and as a barrier to the
advancement of the minority group of which plaintiff is a member). A similar argu-
ment tying individual interests to the use of disparate impact theory may be made
under Section 703(a)(i).
96. Even when the precise term "intent" is used in the Act, the courts have not
given it a uniform meaning. Thus, Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g),
empowering the court to grant injunctive and affirmative relief if it finds the employer
has "intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice," has been construed to require only that the employer's action not be acci-
dental. It thus does not require proof of discriminatory intent. E.g., Williams v. Gen-
eral Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
In contrast, the Court has construed the proviso insulating bona fide seniority
and merit systems that "are not the result of an intention to discriminate" in Section
703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), as requiring a finding of discriminatory intent. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1982) (post-Act seniority system);
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race or sex plays a role. 97
More straightforward support for a disparate impact theory
focusing on the status or condition of the group can be found in
Section 703(a)(2). This section prohibits actions that "in any way
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities" or "otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or
as an applicant for employment." This language potentially en-
compasses practices that are not animated by an intent to deprive
and paves the way for use of disparate impact analysis in which
proof of group adverse impact supplies the causal tie to race.98
The ambiguity of the language of Title VII, compatible as it
is with two conceptions of equality and two theories of liability, is
only compounded by the equally ambiguous legislative history
surrounding Title VII. 99 Like the statutory language, the legisla-
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977) (pre-
Act seniority system).
97. E.g., it would not stretch the familiar meaning of "because of' to conclude
that an applicant for employment was deprived of a job opportunity "because of'
race if past educational deficiencies resulting from racial discrimination prevented the
applicant from achieving a passing score on an employment test, whether or not the
test itself was job-related or neutrally motivated.
98. Justice Powell described the causal link in disparate impact cases in his dis-
sent in Teal:
In disparate-impact cases, by contrast, the plaintiff seeks to carry his
burden of proof by way of inference-by showing that an employer's
selection process results in the rejection of a disproportionate number of
members of a protected group to which he belongs. From such a show-
ing a fair inference then may be drawn that the rejected applicant, as a
member of that disproportionately excluded group, was himself a vic-
tim of that process' "built-in head winds."
Teal, 457 U.S. at 458-59 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Similar views have been ex-
pressed by commentators:
The inference of discrimination that arises from a showing of
group adverse impact may only be "rebutted," however, by a showing
that the discriminatory policy is justified by business necessity. Because
the state of defendant's mind is not a critical factor under disparate
impact theory, causation is generally not a critical issue in such cases,
except insofar as causal inquiries are necessary to determine whether
the challenged policy is indeed causing the observed disparate impact.
D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at 45.
99. Title VII is only one part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a comprehensive
civil rights enactment. The other components of the Act are: Title I, Voting Rights,
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976); Title II, Public Accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6
(1976); Title III, Public Facilities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b to b-3 (1976); Title IV, Public
Education, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to c-9 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Title V, Civil Rights
Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 1975a-d (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Title VI, Federally Assisted
Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Title VIII, Voting Statis-
tics, 42 U.S.C. § 2000f (1976).
The political heat surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted in an unu-
sual legislative procedure. Since the bill went directly to the Senate floor from the
House, there is no Senate Committee Report. The report of the House Judiciary
Committee deals with a bill that differs somewhat from the final legislation. The most
significant changes made by the Senate related to enforcement powers of the EEOC.
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tive history of the 1964 Act can reasonably be interpreted to sup-
port both theories of liability and corresponding conceptions of
equality.
Uppermost in the mind of Congress was the classic disparate
treatment case. l°° Repeated references to the establishment of a
"legislative civil right"'' l embodying the guarantees of the consti-
tutional right to equal protection 10 2 clearly indicate that Congress
was concerned with elimination of intentional discrimination in
the paradigm disparate treatment context.
10 3
The legislative history, however, also contains much implicit
support for a disparate impact approach. The detailed House Ju-
110 CONG. REC. 12,721-25 (1964), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 5, at 3003 (comments of Senator Humphrey). The coverage and substantive
prohibitions of the Act, however, remained basically unchanged. For more thorough
descriptions of the procedural legislative background culminating in Title VII, see
EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 7-11, and Vaas, Title VI" Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 443-47 (1966).
100. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). See also
Senator Clark's definition of discrimination:
Discrimination is a word which has been used in State FEPC statutes
for at least 20 years, and has been used in Federal statutes, such as the
National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, for
even a longer period. To discriminate is to make distinctions or differ-
ences in the treatment of employees, and are prohibited only if they are
based on any of the five forbidden criteria (race, color, religion, sex or
national origin); any other criteria or qualification is untouched by this
bill.
110 CONG. REC. 7218 (1964), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5,
at 3015 (In response to a memorandum propounding questions by Senator Dirksen
(R., Ill.)). Clark, a floor manager of the bill, emphasized that "[niothing in the bill
will interfere with merit hiring, or merit promotion. The bill simply eliminates con-
sideration of color from the decision to hire or promote." Id.
101. 110 CONG. REC. 13,080 (1964), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 3092 (remarks of Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964), reprinted
in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3190 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
102. The Supreme Court has held that claims of both race and sex discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause require proof of a discrimi-
natory motive before the courts may apply heightened scrutiny. Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (race); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 271-74 (1979) (sex). These cases were, of course, decided over a decade after
Title VII was enacted. It is by no means certain that in 1964 Congress conceived of
the equal protection right solely as a protection against purposeful discrimination.
Cf. Jacobs, supra note 88, at 316-17 (by 1972, "Congress' understanding of what dis-
crimination was proscribed by the equal protection clause rested on the impact
standard").
103. The proponents of the Act also sought to discredit claims of opponents that
Title VII would introduce mandatory quota hiring by professing that "the color of a
man's skin. . . should be [a] completely extraneous consideration. . . when an em-
ployer hires ...... 110 CONG. REC. 9881 (1964), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3187 (comments of Sen. Allott (R., Colo.) in support of an
anti-quota amendment similar to Section 7030) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2j
(1976)).
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diciary Report '04 carefully documented the practical concerns that
provided the impetus for the legislation-that is, the harsh effects
of racial discrimination. The high black unemployment rate, the
low median annual income of blacks, the high infant mortality
rate of black children and correspondingly low life expectancy,
were labeled as an "economic waste"' 10 5 that not only deprived
blacks of first class citizenship but also hampered the national
prosperity. 1°6 The Committee believed that it was possible to
eliminate these inequities: "All that is needed is the institution of
proper training programs and the elimination of discrimination in
employment practices."' 10 7
There was thus an expectation, by the Committee at least,
that the end of discrimination as that concept was embodied in
Title VII would bring about profound economic and social
changes. The EEOC was charged with the duty to usher in this
new era, and it is reasonable to suppose that Congress contem-
plated some evolution regarding the types of practices to be con-
sidered discriminatory as the agency progressed in its
monumental task.108 Specifically, inasmuch as Congress ex-
pressed the impetus for Title VII in terms of the economic harm
104. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2001-2176.
105. H.R. REP. No. 914, PART 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1963), reprinted in
EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2148-49.
106. For example, in 1962, the unemployment rate for whites was 4.9%; for non-
whites, 11.0%. In 1960, the median income of nonwhite males was 59.9% that of white
males. The median income of nonwhite females was 50.3% that of white females. Id.
The legislative history of the 1964 Act does not, however, evidence a comparable
concern for the economic condition of women. The addition of sex as a prohibited
category of discrimination was a result of a floor amendment by Southern congress-
men who hoped thereby to defeat the legislation. Congressman Smith (D., Va.) intro-
duced the amendment by reading a letter from a constituent who expressed a desire
that an amendment adding sex would guarantee the "right" of every woman to a
husband, a "right" that was in jeopardy because of the "imbalance" created by
2,661,000 more females than males in the country. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964), re-
printed in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3213-14. The amendment
was taken seriously by some members of Congress, however, and was passed in the
House by a vote of 168 to 133. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in EEOC
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3218-28 (remarks by Congresswomen Grif-
fiths, Bolton, St. George, and Green). By 1971, there was no question that the Con-
gress intended to fully protect women's rights. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. &
LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1971, H.R.
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1971); SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC
WELFARE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1971, S.
REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1971).
107. H.R. REP. No. 914, PART II, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1963), reprinted in
EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2149.
108. See Belton, supra note 10, at 539-42; Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra
note 19, at 12-14; Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws- A GeneralApproach to Objective Criteria ofHiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1598, 1614 (1969).
19831
328 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:305
sustained by protected groups because of discrimination, the
EEOC would be justified in identifying discrimination by measur-
ing the adverse impact of employment practices on protected
groups. 10 9
Finally, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Ti-
tle VII eliminated any significance that courts could have attached
to the ambiguity of the 1964 legislative history regarding Con-
gress' anticipation of a group-oriented approach to Title VII com-
pliance. By 1971, Congress was fully aware that the
discrimination subject to agency and court action encompassed
far more than intentional action against individuals. The Report
of the House Committee on Education and Labor" 10 described the
contemporary understanding of employment discrimination as a
"complex and pervasive phenomenon"I' that involved systematic
as well as individual harms. The Report also explicitly recognized
that widespread unintentional discrimination remained a critical
problem "whose resolution requires not only expert assistance, but
also the technical perception that a problem exists in the first
place, and that the system complained of is unlawful."' 1 2 Thus,
the legislative history indicates that although Congress may not
have explicitly sanctioned disparate impact theory in 1964, it later
was willing to accept an operational definition of "discrimination"
that incorporated disparate impact analysis. 13 As was true in the
109. Understandably, however, the Judiciary Committee was not willing to
achieve these largely economic goals at any cost. Rather, the Committee admonished
the EEOC to leave "management prerogatives, and union freedoms... undisturbed
to the greatest extent possible." H.R. REP. No. 914, PART II, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29
(1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2150.
110. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971). For a more thorough ex-
amination of the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, see Jacobs,
supra note 88, at 313-21.
The Court has waivered on the propriety of using the legislative history of the
1972 amendments to interpret the provisions of the 1964 Act. Thus, in International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977), the Supreme Court
stated that the legislative history of the 1972 amendments should not be used to inter-
pret Section 703(h), an original provision of the 1964 Act. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982), however, the Court supported its analysis of the meaning of Griggs
and Section 703(a)(2) by reference to the legislative history of the 1972 amendments.
Id. at 447 n.8. The majority reasoned that the 1972 legislative history was relevant in
Teal because the 1972 amendments extended the protection of the Act to public em-
ployers, like the defendant in Teal. Id. There is nothing in the majority opinion,
however, to suggest that the Teal analysis should not be equally applicable to private
employers. Rather, the Court stated that Congress intended to accord the same pro-
tection to employees in both the public and private sectors. Id. at 449.
Ill. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
112. Id.
113. The House also cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), with
approval and thus explicitly recognized the Court's use of disparate impact analysis to
enlarge the operative definition of discrimination. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1971).
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eight years preceding the 1972 legislative reappraisal, the courts
and the EEOC were to have the major responsibility for guiding
the evolution of the theories and thus the extent of actionable
discrimination.
C. Disparate Treatment Cases: The Role of Intent
Probably the more familiar of the two theories of liability is
the disparate treatment theory, 14 which often focuses on race-
based harms to particular individuals." 5 The theory's resem-
blance to the equality guarantee of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment makes it an easily accepted method for
eliminating the most recognizable forms of discrimination. As re-
quired by the constitutional standard for equal protection
claims, 116 proof of defendant's discriminatory intent is a prerequi-
site to liability in disparate treatment cases. In constitutional liti-
gation, the requirement of intent serves to limit the instances in
which the courts may properly refuse to defer to legislative judg-
ments. 117 Analogously, the requirement of intent in disparate
treatment cases under Title VII functions as a restraint on judicial
intrusion into employer decisionmaking.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green 118 established that in the indi-
vidual case,' 19 liability depends on whether the employer's action
was "racially premised."'' 20 The Court characterized the shared
societal interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship as-
sured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel
decisions"' 12' as sufficient to support a broad prohibition on ra-
cially biased decisionmaking. Proof of discriminatory motive thus
114. See supra text accompanying notes 50-71.
115. See generally Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VI7"
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201
(1982).
116. See cases cited supra note 102.
117. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). For a discussion of the role of motivation in constitutional
analysis, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 115-18 (1971).
118. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
119. Classwide claims of disparate treatment are also available under Title VII.
See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 12, § 1.4, at
16-33. As in the individual case, proof of discriminatory intent is critical in classwide
claims. International Bhd of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. In a classwide claim,
however, a strong showing of statistical proof of discrimination will often be enough
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note
12, at § 1.221[1] (Supp. 1983). In individual cases of discrimination, there is less
agreement in the caselaw regarding the sufficiency of statistics alone to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at § 1.222(1].
120. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 n.18.
121. Id. at 801.
1983]
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functioned as conclusive proof that the challenged action was un-
justified; no showing of business necessity could override the
plaintifis proof of intentional discrimination. 22 Since McDonnell
Douglas, the Court has not wavered on the necessity of proving
intent in disparate treatment cases and has continued to hinge lia-
bility solely upon proof of this critical element. 123
By insisting on proof of discriminatory intent, the Court has
protected the employer's prerogative to make unwise or even irra-
tional decisions that adversely affect individual minority mem-
bers.' 24 Private employers, unconstrained by the commands of
the due process clause or other constitutional limitations, gener-
ally have no duty to act fairly or even rationally with respect to
their employees. 25 Title VII's prohibition of disparate treatment,
then, operates not as a refinement of an overall duty to act fairly,
122. Under § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981), the defense of a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) may be invoked to justify explicit dis-
crimination based on religion, sex or national origin. There is no BFOQ defense
available, however, for discrimination based on race or color. In non-race cases, it is
unlikely that the courts will sustain an "eleventh hour" claim of a BFOQ in a covert,
intentional discrimination case. Cf. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-
Motive Title VII Action. A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982)
(examining cases involving employer decisions premised on unlawful motivation that
could be justified by lawful considerations).
123. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per
curiam); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978).
124. The only constraint on the employer is that the unwise action not be a pretext
for intentional disparate treatment. See, e.g., St. Peter v. Secretary of Army, 659 F.2d
1133, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring) ("Employers usually act in their
own best interests, and it is somewhat incongruous to find that the employer chose a
less-qualified man, rather than a more-qualified woman, but did not do so for dis-
criminatory reasons. Although it may be difficult to convince a trier of fact that an
employer selected a less-qualified person for a nondiscriminatory reason, such behav-
ior is not actionable."); Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 162 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title VII
"does not prohibit all arbitrary employment practices. It does not forbid an employer
to hire only persons born under a certain sign of the Zodiac or persons having long or
short hair or no hair at all."); Washington v. Kroger, 671 F.2d 1072, 1077 (8th Cir.
1981); Miller v. WFLI Radio Inc., 51 U.S.L.W. 2510-52 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 1982);
Osborne v. Cleland, 620 F.2d 195, 199 n.5 (1980); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of
Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 262 n.36 (1980). But see Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All
Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J.
519 (1980), for the pre-Burdine view that, in its operation, Title VII protects all work-
ers from arbitrary treatment.
125. One exception, however, to the traditional common law rule that employ-
ment contracts are terminable at will is an emerging doctrine that restricts employers'
prerogatives in discharging an employee. Under this doctrine, an employer is not free
to discharge when the motivation is deemed contrary to a strong public policy, such as
the policy against discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (sexual harassment). The abusive discharge
doctrine has not yet gained widespread acceptance, however, and there is still no gen-
eral prohibition against discharge without "just cause." See Comment, 4 Common
Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975);
Annot., 14 A.L.R. 4th 544, 558-60 (1982).
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but as a distinct constraint that interferes with an employer's
otherwise undisturbed prerogative.
Despite its familiarity, the intent requirement in individual
cases does not flow inescapably from either the language or legis-
lative history of Title VII. 126 Just as a neutral, but unjustified,
practice adversely affecting the group can be labeled as discrimi-
natory under Title VII,12 7 the statutory language is capable on its
face of supporting an operative definition of discrimination that
encompasses any unjustified employer action that harms an indi-
vidual minority employee. 28 Thus an employer's isolated, but
nevertheless unreasonable, decision to fire a black employee, even
if not racially motivated, could conceivably contravene Title VII's
explicit antidiscrimination mandate. Moreover, it is likely that an
interpretation of Title VII outlawing any unjustified employer ac-
tion that adversely affects even one black employee would im-
prove the employment status of blacks as a group.
However, if unjustified adverse impact on the individuals
alone were actionable under Title VII, it would severely alter the
employer's autonomous position with respect to routine decision-
making and create a tremendous strain on judicial resources.
Many employers who act in an evenhanded manner could expect
their employment decisions at some point to become proper sub-
jects for challenge. Over time, even the most facially innocuous
personnel practices may operate to the disadvantage of a minority
126. See supra text accompanying notes 90-113 (discussion of language and legis-
lative history of Title VII).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 72-89 and infra text accompanying notes
143-93 (discussion of the disparate impact theory).
128. Given the inferior economic and social position of blacks, it is possible to
assume that identical employer action (e.g., arbitrary dismissal) affecting both a black
and a white employee tends to hurt the black worker more. The black worker is likely
to have less job mobility and fewer substitute employment opportunities. Thus, the
minority status of the individual black worker perhaps may be viewed as a "cause" of
his greater harm, even absent proof of intentional disparate treatment or classwide
adverse impact on blacks. In such cases, if the greater detriment arguably suffered by
the individual black worker were to become the touchstone of liability, there would
not appear to be any principled limit on the range of individual and social factors
which the court should take into account in determining liability for individual inju-
ries. The difficulties that would be posed by so unmanageable a theory of liability
might well be thought to outweigh any incremental benefit gained by the eradication
of an unintentional practice that harms only an individual minority worker.
Unquestionably, there is no justification for using Title VII to remedy unjustified
employer action that harms only an individual white worker. Unless the employer's
action is motivated by race, such action cannot possibly be the basis of a Title VII
claim because the harm cannot plausibly be connected to race. Unlike action ad-
versely affecting an individual minority worker, action adversely affecting a white
worker does not reverberate in a society that generally disadvantages whites. Because
whites are not a traditionally victimized group in our society, there is no reason to
suppose that the race of the worker will likely aggravate the injury produced by the
employer's action.
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employee. The Title VII machinery 129 is not designed to accom-
modate the volume of litigation that would likely result from such
a broad reading of the statutory language. Rather than reinforce
Title VII's antidiscrimination mandate, such an expansive con-
struction of the Act would transform the legislation from an an-
tidiscrimination measure to a fair employment practices code, a
result clearly not sanctioned by the scheme of the Act.
130
Moreover, prohibiting unjustified adverse impact on individ-
ual members of a protected group could be perceived as unfair
and would be hard to reconcile with any conception of equality
implied in Title VII.' 3' Although neither the language of Title
VII nor the legislative history of the Act explicitly endorses a sin-
gle, precise conception of equality,132 two general features of Con-
gress's attitude toward equality can be inferred with some
assurance. First, at the heart of the protection afforded by the Act
is the judgment that it is unfair to single out an individual for
disadvantageous treatment simply because of race. 133 The Act
thus imposes a kind of competitive equality in the work force by
generally requiring an employer to make decisions on a color-
blind basis. 134 The requirement of unbiased decisionmaking also
assures that individuals will be treated as equals and reflects a
moral sentiment that respect for individual dignity is fundamen-
tally at odds with racist views. 135
129. Title VII requires that an individual who has a grievance first file a complaint
with the EEOC. The EEOC is empowered to investigate the charges and to attempt
to resolve claims by means of "conference, conciliation and persuasion where there
exists "reasonable cause" to believe a violation has occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1981). If these informal methods fail, an action may be brought in federal court by
either the individual complainant, the EEOC, or, in the case of public employer de-
fendants, the Attorney General. For a detailed discussion of Title VII litigation pro-
cedure, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 769-1082.
130. For an example of a true fair employment practices code, see the Civil Serv-
ice Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 5 U.S.C.), which mandates merit-based employment practices.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62
132. See supra text accompanying notes 90-113.
133. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7218 (1964), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 5, at 3107.
134. A major exception to the color-blindness requirement underlying disparate
treatment theory is that accorded to valid affirmative action programs. United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), discussed infra text accompanying notes 247-
254. Although Title VII protects whites as well as blacks from invidious disparate
treatment, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), Weber insu-
lates reasonable affirmative action programs from the Act's proscriptions. See gener-
ally Belton, supra note 10; Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra note 19, at 1; Boyd,
Affirmative Action in Employment-The Weber Decision, 66 IowA L. REV. 1 (1980).
135. See H.R. REP. No. 914, at 30, reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at
2151:
Aside from the political and economic considerations, however, we
believe in the creation of job equality because it is the right thing to do.
EQUALITY UNDER TITLE VII
Second, both proponents and opponents of the Act 36 agreed
that Title VII did not mandate a rigid kind of distributive equality
in which the employment opportunities would be allocated with-
out regard to merit and solely in proportion to the representation
of protected groups in the general population. Quotas and prefer-
ences, at least in their most extreme and direct form, were consid-
ered antithetical to Title VII objectives. 137
If a Title VII violation could be made out solely by proving
unjustified adverse impact affecting an individual minority em-
ployee, the remedy in such a case would likely be regarded as a
racial preference unsupported by the Act. When the only charge
leveled against an employer is an unreasonable response in an iso-
lated incident, it is very difficult to find a sufficient causal nexus
between the unfair treatment and the employee's race. 138 Provid-
ing a remedy to a minority employee in such a case would afford
the kind of race-conscious treatment that is justified only in re-
sponse to a demonstration of entrenched, systematic group
inequality. 139
Thus, requiring proof of intent in individual Title VII cases
performs two functions. First, the requirement reinforces the
traditional view that competitive equality and respect for individ-
ual dignity can best be assured if employer actions based upon
discriminatory motive are outlawed. 140 Second, the intent re-
quirement also operates as a direction to the judiciary not to dis-
turb employer choice unless there is some assurance that the
interference is required to remove employment barriers that pose
We believe in the inherent dignity of man. He is born with certain
inalienable rights. His uniqueness is such that we refuse to treat him as
if his rights and well-being are bargainable. All vestiges of inequality
based solely on race must be removed in order to preserve our demo-
cratic society, to maintain our country's leadership, and to enhance
mankind.
136. See Section 7030) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), reprinted infra note
285.
137. Eg., in response to an objection posed by opponents of the bill that Title VII
would "require employers to establish quotas for nonwhites in proportion to the per-
centage of nonwhites in the labor market area," Senator Clark remarked that
"[q]uotas are themselves discriminatory." 110 CONG. REC. 7218, reprinted in EEOC
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3015. See also 110 CONG. REC. 9881-82 and
110 CONG. REC. 8921, reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at
3187-90 (legislative debate surrounding Section 703(j) of Title VII, 40 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j)).
138. See supra note 128.
139. See Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711-13 (4th
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (absent proof of discriminatory intent, Title VII does not protect
black plaintiff who demonstrated only that he, alone, experienced adverse impact
from operation of defendant's training program); accord Pinckney v. County of
Northampton, 512 F. Supp. 989, 996 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
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an obstacle for the group as a whole, not simply for individual
members. By thus forbidding displacement of management pre-
rogative unless the consequences are sufficiently widespread, the
intent requirement functions as a definitional balancing 14' of em-
ployee and employer interests: absent proof of intentional dis-
crimination, 142 neutral practices will be examined and their
fairness and efficiency judged only when there is systematic dis-
advantaging as evidenced by group adverse impact.
D. Eliminating Unnecessary Barriers to Equality- Divorcing
Intent From Liability in Disparate Impact Cases
The group-centered disparate impact theory of Title VII lia-
bility reaches further in its effect on employers than the individ-
ual-centered disparate treatment theory. As the offspring of the
cross-fertilization between the courts and the EEOC, 14 3 disparate
141. For a discussion of definitional balancing in the first amendment context, see
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time. First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 939-48 (1968) (advocating
definitional balancing rather than ad hoc balancing in free speech cases); Black, Mr.
Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, in C. BLACK, THE OCCA-
SIONS OF JUSTICE 89 (1963); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 96 (1962).
142. Of course, simply requiring proof of discriminatory motive does not exhaust
the inquiry in disparate treatment cases. Fashioning a workable definition of discrim-
inatory motive and determining the allocation of burdens of proof of such motive are
complex problems that have absorbed the Supreme Court as well as the lower tribu-
nals. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), vacating 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979); Board
of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam), vacating 569 F.2d 169 (1st
Cir. 1978); Furnco Construction Co., 438 U.S. 567 (1978), reversing 551 F.2d 1085 (7th
Cir. 1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), vacating 463 F.2d 563 (8th
Cir. 1972). See also Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. United
States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003
(1st Cir. 1979) (all treating allocation of the burden of proof); EEOC v. Radiator
Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979) (refining plaintiffs prila facie burden of
proof on qualifications); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D.
Tex. 1980) (treating question of unavailability of data as related to plaintiffs prima
facie burden); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Service, 22 E.P.D. 30,765
(N.D. Miss. 1980) (refining defendant's burden of producing evidence of good faith to
rebut plaintiffs prima facie case). See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, Supra note 12,
at § 6.2 (Supp. 1981).
143. The EEOC is the principal agency charged with enforcing Title VII and pro-
viding leadership and coordination to efforts of the other federal agencies which en-
force laws and policies requiring equal employment opportunity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
4-5 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978).
Other federal agencies that played a key role in developing the legal standards for test
and other selection device validation were the Justice and Labor Departments and the
Civil Service Commission. See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment
Guidelines: Administering a Polycentric Problem, 33 AD. L. REV. 323, 329-36 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines];
Note, The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.- Compromises and
Controversies, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 605, 607-10 (1979).
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impact analysis has grown in spurts in response to concrete
problems, rather than as a neatly packaged theory of liability.
The EEOC first applied a disparate impact analysis in con-
nection with employment tests. The simple 1966 Guidelines on
employment testing procedures'" interpreted Section 703(h) of
the Act, 145 dealing with professionally developed ability tests, as
permitting the use of only job-related tests, regardless of the ab-
sence of discriminatory intent by the employer. Although a seem-
ingly modest requirement, the implications of the early Gudelines
were far-reaching. Abandoning the intent requirement meant not
only an easing of proof problems for potential plaintiffs but an
expansion of the conception of equality beyond equal treatment to
include the notion of fair access to job opportunities for the group.
During the first five years immediately following passage of
Title VII, lower courts applied an effects test to invalidate selec-
tion devices such as pre-employment tests 146 and other hiring
qualifications, 47 hiring hall arrangements, 148 word of mouth
144. The 1966 EEOC Guidelines provided:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed
ability test" to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or
skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the applicant
seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to measure the
applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs. The fact
that a test was prepared by an individual or organization claiming ex-
pertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within
the meaning of Title VII.
EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures (Aug. 24, 1966), reprinted in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971).
145. Section 703(h) states in pertinent part:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability
test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results
is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The provision was added by floor amendment by Sen-
ator Tower because of a concern that job-related tests might be deemed invalid under
Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1970),
rev'd in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a thorough discussion of legislative history
surrounding Section 703(h), see id. at 1241-43 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No.
36, 416 F.2d 123, 136 (8th Cir. 1969) (court struck down subjective grading system
even though there was no direct evidence of intentional discrimination); Arrington v.
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1358-59 (D. Mass. 1969) (test
with disparate impact is discriminatory unless demonstrable evidence of correlation
between test scores and job performance).
147. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal.
1970), modo/ed, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1973) (refusal to hire frequently arrested
persons).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No.
36, 416 F.2d 123, 129-32 (8th Cir. 1969).
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recruiting, 49 and seniority and transfer systems.' 50 Understanda-
bly, no single view of the effects theory of liability emerged. Other
than agreeing that proof of post-Act discriminatory intent was not
a necessary ingredient of every claim, the cases during this initial
period differed both in theory and application.
There were two decisions involving seniority and transfer sys-
tems that perpetuated the effects of the employer's pre-Act inten-
tional discrimination that proved to be highly influential. In both
Quarles v. Phillip Morris Inc. 151 and Local 189, United Papermak-
ers & Paperworkers v. United States, 5 2 the courts rejected a con-
struction of Title VII that would have had the effect of "freez[ing]
an entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory pat-
terns that existed before the act."' 53
Quarles afforded relief to incumbent black employees who
worked in segregated departments prior to the effective date of the
Act.' 54 The employees challenged restrictive, but facially neutral,
transfer and seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment that made it impossible or costly for black incumbents to
secure positions in predominantly white, higher paying depart-
ments. 155 The court struck down the neutral transfer and seniority
practices because the practices had the effect of perpetuating the
company's pre-Act intentionally discriminatory policy of
segregation. -5 6
Elaborating on the theory of Quarles, Judge Wisdom in Pa-
149. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426-28 (8th
Cir. 1970).
150. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 988-91 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 510-19 (E.D. Va. 1968). The effects test or
disparate impact analysis is no longer available to challenge seniority systems because
of Supreme Court rulings construing section 703(h) as providing an exemption for
bona fide seniority systems that are not intentionally created or maintained for dis-
criminatory purposes. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 70 (1982);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
151. 279 F. Supp 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (Butzner, J., sitting by designation).
152. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) (Wisdom, J.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
153. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. at 516 (E.D. Va. 1968), quoted
with approval in Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d at 987-88 (5th Cir. 1969).
154. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. at 508 (E.D. Va. 1968).
155. Id. at 512-14. Essentially, the challengers objected to the seniority system
that based most opportunities for advancement on departmental rather than employ-
ment seniority. Id. at 513.
156. Id. at 517-19. The Quarles doctrine is commonly referred to as the "present
effects of past discrimination" theory:
Quarles originated the category of discrimination known as perpetua-
tion in the present of the effects of past discrimination, holding that a
seniority and transfer system constituted present discrimination and vi-
olated Title VII if it locked members of a previously discriminated-
against protected group into inferior positions in which they had origi-
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permakers first employed the business necessity test as a mecha-
nism for determining those adverse effects that would be
considered justifiable under Title VII.1 7 The primary challenge
in Papermakers was to the practice of awarding jobs based on job
seniority rather than mill or plant seniority. 158 Plaintiffs claimed
that because jobs and lines of progression had formerly been seg-
regated by race, black incumbents did not presently have an equal
opportunity to attain job seniority and to compete for the more
desirable jobs.159 Judge Wisdom required the employer to show
that a facially neutral but harmful practice was "essential to the
safe and efficient operation"'160 of the business. Given the context
of Papermakers, the stringency of the test is not surprising: the
employer's prior discrimination, combined with the "lock-in" ef-
fect of the seniority and transfer provisions, insured that blacks
hired before 1966 would be relegated to a position of "permanent
inferiority" unless Title VII provided a remedy. 16' The remedy
actually imposed was, however, conservatively tailored to com-
pensate only the actual victims of prior discrimination and was
not intended to eradicate all adverse effects on minority employ-
ees that were traceable in any way to the employer's prior
discrimination. 62
nally been placed as a result of [pre-Act] discrimination which was itself
beyond the reach of the court.
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 30.
The Supreme Court no longer permits use of the present effects of past discrimi-
nation theory in cases challenging seniority systems and instead requires proof of
discriminatory motivation. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 352-56 (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558-60 (1977).
See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 12, at § 1.2.
157. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir.
1969).
158. Id. at 984-85. Under the job seniority system, a worker with the most years
in the job slot below the vacancy had first call. Time worked in the mill was not
important to determining first bidding rights.
159. Id. at 982-86. For a thorough discussion of the complex factual context in
Papermakers, see Bullock, The Focal lssue." Discriminatory Motivation or Adverse Im-
pact?, 34 LA. L. REV. 572, 578-79 (1974).
160. 416 F.2d at 989.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 988-90. In his discussion concerning the obligation of an employer to
undo the effects of past discrimination, Judge Wisdom discussed the remedial theories
presented in a student law review note. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260, 1268-75 (1967). Under one the-
ory-the "freedom now" theory-the employer would be required to remedy all ef-
fects of previous discrimination by restructuring the system and by hiring new black
workers to replace incumbent whites who held jobs that they otherwise would not
have held "but for" the prior discrimination. Judge Wisdom rejected this theory in
favor of the more moderate "rightful place" doctrine that requires only an adjustment
in competitive standing of white and black workers with regard to future job openings
arising in the normal course of the employer's business. Under the "rightful place"
doctrine, white incumbent workers are not bumped out of their present positions by
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The impact of Papermakers soon extended beyond its origi-
nal context to govern two different kinds of impact cases. First, it
was relied on by the eighth circuit in a "present-effects-of-past-
discrimination" context. The case concerned minority workers
who, while not the actual victims of the employer's prior discrimi-
nation, were the primary beneficiaries of the remedial meas-
ures. 163 Second, the business necessity test dramatically surfaced
as the appropriate formula for judging the validity of a neutral
practice that did not build upon prior employer discrimination,
but served instead merely to reinforce the adverse effects of socie-
tal discrimination. In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,164 a federal
district court in California struck down the employer's policy of
disqualifying "frequently-arrested" persons because the policy
had the "foreseeable effect of denying black applicants an equal
opportunity for employment."'' 65 This foreseeability arose solely
from the disproportionate percentage of blacks arrested 66 rather
than any conduct on the part of the employer. Without elabora-
tion, the court noted that the policy was "not justified or excused
by any business necessity,"' 67 thus accepting the formulation of
Papermakers in a "pure" adverse impact case devoid of any pre-
or post-Act intentional discrimination by the employer. 68
These cases represented a significant extension of the holding
of Papermakers because they disturbed practices that were not en-
tirely--or not at all-traceable to employer wrongdoing. Intrigu-
ingly, however, if the reasoning of Judge Wisdom's scholarly and
perhaps prescient opinion in Papermakers is traced to its logical
conclusions, the rationale for such an extension can be found im-
plicit in his analysis.
blacks who have greater plant seniority. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 416
F.2d at 988-89.
163. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426-28 (8th Cir. 1970).
164. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1972).
165. Id. at 403.
166. Although blacks made up only 11% of the national population, they ac-
counted for 27% of all arrests, including 45% of the arrests reported as "suspicion
arrests." Id. at 403.
167. Id. at 402-03. When the employer adopts a policy of disqualifying applicants
based on prior convictions, rather than prior arrests, the policy may sometimes sur-
vive Title VII scrutiny. See, e.g., King v. Girard Bank, 17 F.E.P. 131, 134-35 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (discharge of employee for falsifying information relating to prior convic-
tion was proper due to sensitive nature of banking position); Richardson v. Hotel
Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971), afd mem., 468 F.2d 951
(5th Cir. 1972) (employer entitled to use prior convictions for serious property-related
crime as disqualification for "security sensitive" job). But see Green v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (absolute ban on hiring any person
convicted of non-traffic offense violated Title VII).
168. The Gregory court explicitly relied on Papermakers to justify its decision to
dispense with the intent requirements and to use business necessity as the standard of
liability in disparate impact cases. 316 F. Supp. at 403.
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First, Judge Wisdom characterized the EEOC's position that
only job-related tests would conform to Title VII, as a logical out-
growth of the more general theory that present discriminatory ef-
fects should be tolerated only if justified by business necessity.1 69
It is not entirely clear from this characterization whether Judge
Wisdom thereby meant to limit his endorsement of the EEOC's
position only to instances in which an employer's current practice
reinforced prior overt discrimination practiced by that employer.
A basis for a broader application of the business necessity test,
however, can be found elsewhere in the opinion. Using an oft-
repeated hypothetical regarding typing, Judge Wisdom explained:
Not all "but for" consequences of pre-Act racial classification
warrant relief under Title VII. For example, unquestionably
Negroes, as a class, educated at all-Negro schools in certain
communities have been denied skills available to their white
contemporaries. That fact would not, however, prevent em-
ployers from requiring that applicants for secretarial positions
know how to type, even though this requirement might prevent
Negroes from becoming secretaries.17 0
The court then compared the typing case to the situation
presented in Local 53 of the International Association of Heat &
Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 171 in which a
union, guilty of overt discrimination in the past, used a nepotism
rule that would likely have had the effect of completely excluding
blacks on a permanent basis:
The controlling difference between the hypothetical typing re-
quirement and the nepotism rule rejected in Vogler is business
necessity. When an employer or union has discriminated in the
past and when its present policies renew or exaggerate discrimi-
natory effects, those policies must yield, unless there is an over-
riding, legitimate non-racial business purpose. Secretaries must
be able to type. There is no way around that necessity. A nep-
otism rule, on the other hand, while not unrelated to the train-
ing of craftsmen, is not essential to that end. To be sure, skilled
workers may gain substantial benefits from having grown up in
the home of a member of the trade. It is clear, nonetheless, that
the benefits secured by nepotism must give way because of its
effective continuation and renewal of racial exclusion. 172
From this more general discussion, it is fair to infer that
Judge Wisdom would not limit the application of the business ne-
cessity test to the narrow kind of case before him, i.e., the use of a
neutral device which served to perpetuate the precise discrimina-
tory effects created originally by the employer's overt discrimina-
169. 416 F.2d at 989-90.
170. Id. at 988.
171. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
172. 416 F.2d at 989 (footnote omitted).
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tion. Both the nepotism rule in Vogler and the job seniority and
transfer system in Papermakers built upon the defendant's prior
overt discrimination in a kind of offensive Catch-22 fashion. 173
Thus, a black who wanted to join Local 53 prior to Title VII's
effective date would have been told that the union accepted only
whites. If the rejected applicant's son tried to join after Title VII
became effective, he would have been rejected under the nepotism
rule challenged in Vogler because his father was not a member of
the union. Similarly, as in the more complex Papermakers situa-
tion, blacks who had been excluded from the more lucrative white
jobs prior to the Act would now find it difficult, if not impossible,
to move into those higher-paying jobs because they did not pos-
sess the requisite job seniority. In other words, the defendants in
both of these cases were responsible, without the aid of outside
forces, for the inferior position of the plaintiff class-first by
means of overt discrimination, then by perpetuating the results of
such discrimination by facially neutral practices.
Challenges to hiring tests, such as the hypothetical typing
test, however, are qualitatively different from these Catch-22 situ-
ations. An employer who uses a neutral test to select employees,
whether or not guilty of overt discrimination in the past, may at
most build upon or exaggerate the deprivations caused by societal
discrimination. It is hard to imagine how the use of a facially
neutral pre-employment test could currently interact with an em-
ployer's prior overt discrimination in the same Catch-22 fashion
as a nepotism or seniority rule, unless, of course, the employer
itself had previously given training for the tests only to whites.
Thus, when a testing device is at issue, there must be a judgment
made as to whether the employer's action in using the neutral test-
ing device, when coupled with societal discrimination, violates Ti-
tle VII. By justifying the typing test under the business necessity
standard, Judge Wisdom implicitly acknowledged that such non-
Catch 22 employment barriers should also be subjected to a prob-
ing review under Title VII, at least when the defendant had been
guilty of pre-Act discrimination. Thus, based on the typing hypo-
thetical and his endorsement of the EEOC's position requiring
job-related tests, it appears that Judge Wisdom would require the
employer who had discriminated in the past to refrain from use of
173. Compare the operation of "grandfather" clauses in state voting legislation
whereby black persons were required to pass literacy tests or were otherwise impeded
in their exercise of the franchise simply because their ancestors had been overtly de-
nied the right to vote. In these cases, the justification for imposition of liability is that
the defendant's own prior discrimination made it impossible for the challengers to
qualify to vote under the present "neutral" terms imposed by the defendant. Guinn
& Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915); Meyers & Others v. Anderson,
238 U.S. 368, 380 (1915).
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tests that failed to erase the effects of prior discrimination, unless
justified by business necessity.
The remaining question is whether the business necessity test
should be extended to instances in which an employer's use of a
test builds upon societal discrimination, even though the employer
is not guilty of any pre-Act discrimination. Although Papermak-
ers does not address this question, Judge Wisdom's rationale
again suggests an affirmative answer. Once it is determined that
employers guilty of past discrimination should compensate for so-
cietal discrimination, as such discrimination is reflected in the em-
ployer's present neutral practices, we have departed from
employer intent as the sole basis of liability and are no longer
confining the remedy only to effects traceable to overt employer
discrimination. 74 Consequently, to then insist that only employ-
ers guilty of pre-Act discrimination should be liable for neutral
practices that renew or recreate discriminatory effects, although
not irrational, must depend on a very rough kind of justice requir-
ing that "guilty" parties alone should pay for societal discrimina-
tion, regardless of the lack of any direct causation. 75 When there
is no causal connection between the employer's prior discrimina-
tory acts and the current discriminatory effects, the significance of
the employer's prior discriminatory intent greatly diminishes. In
174. Contrast the approach taken in the school desegregation cases, where the
Court has premised liability on the existence of prior segregative intent by defendant
school boards and has constructed an elaborate evidentiary scheme to trace present
discriminatory effects to past overt discrimination. E.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,
537-42 (1979); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 206-11 (1973). The
Court in school desegregation cases is thus wedded to a "present effects of past dis-
crimination" approach and refuses to adopt pure impact theory whereby de facto
segregation alone would be actionable. For a discussion of the role of intent in school
desegregation cases, see P. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Gov-
ernance of Schools at 76-89 (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at UCL4 Law
Review).
The Court has also adhered to the intent requirement in voter dilution cases but
has had considerable difficulty tracing invidious intent to current disparate effects in
elections. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3275-81 (1982); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-74 (1980).
175. It could be argued, for example, that even though an employer's past inten-
tionally discriminatory acts did not directly contribute to the disadvantage minorities
currently experience when taking neutral pre-employment tests, such intentional dis-
crimination nevertheless indirecty contributed-perhaps because of resulting eco-
nomic harms--to those educational, psychological or other disabilities that may
disadvantage minorities now taking such tests. To impose liability differentially on
this basis on employers guilty of past discrimination, however, would be to impose
blame unjustifiably based on an attenuated version of causation. It could as easily be
argued-and be disproved with no less difficulty-that nondiscriminatory employers
who in the past did not practice affirmative action are just as responsible for the cur-
rent adverse effects of neutral employment practices that lock in past societal
discrimination.
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contrast, extending liability to all employers who use unjustified
practices that build upon societal discrimination, regardless of
pre-Act discrimination, eliminates difficult judgments as to blame-
worthiness and is reflective of a utilitarian approach that seeks to
eliminate all arbitrary barriers to achieving a specific goal--ex-
panding opportunities for Title VII beneficiaries. The divorce
from an intent-based system is thus complete and the elements of
such an approach can be found implicit in the Papermakers
analysis.
Papermakers was not cited in the unanimous Supreme Court
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,176 the Court's first endorse-
ment of impact theory. But Griggs is very much the offspring of
Judge Wisdom's earlier decision, in language as well as theory. 77
Most significantly, Griggs has been interpreted as an endorsement
of "pure" disparate impact theory in which the intent of the em-
ployer is not a critical factor. 178
Griggs invalidated an employer's use of educational 179 and
testing 8 ° requirements for hiring and transfer that had a signifi-
cant adverse effect on blacks.' 8 ' The Court imposed liability de-
spite its agreement with the lower court's finding that the
176. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Both parties, however, cited Papermakers in their briefs,
see Brief for Petitioners at 16, 26, 28, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Brief for Respondent at 49, 50, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), as did
the Attorney General for the State of New York and the United States in their amicus
curiae briefs in support of plaintiff. Brief of Attorney General of the State of New
York as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 9, 19, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 11, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
177. The Supreme Court in Griggs was also influenced by Judge Sobelofi's dis-
senting Court of Appeals opinion. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237
(1970) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting); see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 78
(1972) (hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise].
178. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 55.
179. Duke Power Company formerly had required a high school education for
any initial assignment to a department other than the low-paying, previously segre-
gated, Labor Department and for most transfers between departments. 401 U.S. at
427. After July 1965, the Company allowed incumbent employees who lacked a high
school education to transfer to one of the higher-paying departments if they passed
two general intelligence tests. Id. at 427-28.
180. After Title VII became effective, the Company required applicants to pass
two general intelligence tests-the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett
Mechanical Comprehension Test-to qualify for initial placement in any department
other than the Labor Department or to become eligible to transfer to the four higher-
paying departments. Id. at 428.
181. According to 1960 census statistics, in North Carolina, the site of Duke Power
Company, 34% of white males and 12% of black males completed high school. Id. at
430 n.6. For proof of the disparate impact of the general intelligence tests on blacks,
the Supreme Court cited an EEOC decision that showed 58% of whites but only 6% of
blacks passed a battery of tests that included the Wonderlic and Bennett tests. Id.
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requirements were not the product of discriminatory intent. 82
The essential similarity in approach between Griggs and Pa-
permakers lies in the Supreme Court's abandonment of the intent
requirement 83 and its acceptance of business necessity as the pri-
mary determinant of liability in a disparate impact case.18 4 In an
opinion reminiscent of Judge Wisdom's attempt to reconcile the
early effects cases, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in
Griggs, stated that:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited.'8 5
It is clear after Griggs that the Supreme Court will not be
satisfied with an employer's mere assertion of a nondiscriminatory
purpose for a challenged policy or practice that has an adverse
impact on a protected group.186 At the least, the Court will de-
mand that the employer show a "demonstrable"' 187 or "mani-
fest"' 8 8  relationship between the practice and the
nondiscriminatory purpose. Griggs thus established that practices
carrying adverse group impact must be justified, without furnish-
ing a complete structure for the impact case or delineating the pre-
cise contours of the business necessity defense. 89
Given the variety of business practices potentially covered by
Title VII, it is not surprising that the ten years of litigation since
182. Id. at 432. Duke Power, however, had been guilty of pre-Act discrimination.
Prior to the date Title VII became effective, the Company only employed blacks in
the Labor Department. The highest paid workers in the Labor Department were paid
less than the lowest paid workers in the other four all-white departments. Id. at 427.
183. Id. at 430.
184. Id. at 431.
185. Id.
186. The Griggs Court did not explicitly adopt Papermakers' stringent definition
of business necessity that required that the practice be "essential to the safe and effi-
cient operation" of the business. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (1969). This failure, however, might be attributable
to the fact that such a broad endorsement was unnecessary in Griggs because Duke
Power based its case primarily on its lack of discriminatory intent and did not even
attempt to prove that its requirements were job-related. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 43 1.
The "safe and efficient job performance" definition was later cited with approval in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 n.14 (1977).
187. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
188. Id. at 432.
189. By construing § 703(h) of Title VII, reprinted supra note 145, as insulating
only tests shown to be job-related, the Court put tests on a par legally with other
selection devices, such as educational requirements, that are potentially vulnerable
under a "pure" disparate impact analysis, if they produce adverse impact. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has never used § 703(h) to justify treating tests differently from other
selection devices. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982) (Section 703(h)
does not provide "special haven" for discriminatory tests).
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Griggs have not provided definitive answers to the questions left
open by Griggs. There is still much controversy regarding the
reach of Title VII. Behind the difficulties in framing the contours
of the business necessity test' 90 and otherwise structuring the im-
pact case' 9' lies a more basic theoretical problem: the problem is
to provide a definition of "adverse impact" that accords with its
function as a key determinant of liability.
Defining what constitutes "sufficient" adverse impact on the
group to trigger the justification requirement has proven to be far
more difficult than simply articulating the basic elements of dispa-
rate impact theory. The Court's rejection of the "bottom line"
concept has eased the confusion in one respect: it clearly holds
that disparate impact theory was not to be confined only to those
settings in which the defendant has failed to provide sufficient op-
portunities for minorities in proportion to the available labor
force. 192 Yet, at the same time, the Court's disavowal of the bot-
tom line principle brings into question the rationale for confining
the justification requirement to cases of systematic group disad-
vantage. After Teal, adverse impact is still the touchstone for
non-intent based liability, but the concept of adverse impact is not
exclusively associated with an assessment of group opportunity as
measured in its most concrete form-the overall result of the hir-
ing or promotion process. 193 A theory that will reconcile this re-
fined definition of adverse impact, now divorced from the bottom
line principle, with the continuing use of adverse impact as the
triggering mechanism for justification has yet to be articulated by
the Court. Absent such a theory, Teal may exacerbate the tension
between the two conceptions of equality previously endorsed by
the Court and may serve to discredit the legitimacy of the group-
oriented conception underlying disparate impact analysis.
190. For a discussion of the various formulations of business necessity defense, see
Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15
GA. L. REV. 376 (1981), and supra note 74.
191. For discussion of the question of allocation of burdens of production and
persuasion in disparate impact cases, see Furnish, supra note 79, at 419. See also
supra note 74.
192. See discussion of Teal supra text accompanying notes 29-37 and infra text
accompanying notes 229-46.
193. Teal didnot, however, decide whether the bottom line principle could be
used aggressively by plaintiffs to prove adverse impact. Teal addressed only the de-
fensive use of the principle by employers. The bottom line principle may aid plain-
tiffs in unusual cases in which none of the components of a multistage selection
process has a substantial disparate impact, but the cumulative or bottom line effect of
the components nevertheless discloses such a substantial adverse effect. See Vulcan
Society of the N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265,
1267-72 (S.D.N.Y.), afird, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973). Such an aggressive use of the
bottom line focus would not appear to be as destructive of individual minority inter-
ests and thus may well survive Teal. See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
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II. THE "BOTTOM LINE" DEBATE: TENSIONS IN DISPARATE
IMPACT THEORY
A. Evolution of the Bottom Line Debate
1. Developments Before Teal
The sharp split on the Court in Teal1 94 accurately mirrored
the competing concerns that had prevented both the federal en-
forcement agencies 95 and the lower courts 196 from reaching com-
plete agreement as to the legal sufficiency of the bottom line focus.
Unlike the Teal majority's wholesale rejection of the bottom line
principle, however, both the agencies and a majority of lower
courts displayed a limited approval of the principle, if only in a
tentative, grudging manner. In this sense, the Teal decision repre-
sented not only an important shift in direction in the law but one
that was not clearly foreshadowed by the Court's own prior
decisions. 197
The positions of the federal agencies' 98 responsible for en-
forcing antidiscrimination employment laws had evolved over a
decade to a point where each agency agreed to use the bottom line
principle to guide its exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Prior to
the adoption of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures in 1978,199 there was a sharp dispute among the agen-
cies regarding the appropriateness of the bottom line focus. 2°°
194. For a listing of the Justices in the majority and dissent in Teal, see supra
notes 24-25.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 198-209.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 210-15.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 216-28.
198. The three agencies that currently share the major responsibility for enforcing
antidiscrimination in employment laws and policies are the EEOC and the Depart-
ments of Justice and Labor. In 1979, the EEOC was given the responsibility for as-
suring equal opportunity in federal employment, replacing the functions formerly
performed by the Civil Service Commission. Exec. Order No. 12,106, 44 Fed. Reg.
1053 (1979). This current organization reflects significant changes made during the
Carter Administration whereby the EEOC was given greater responsibility for leader-
ship and coordination of federal efforts. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321
(1979), and Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978).
The Department of Labor was also vested with greater authority to oversee the
contract compliance program requiring government contractors both to refrain from
discrimination in employment and to engage in affirmative action. Exec. Order
12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978). One district court, however, has recently declared
the Reorganization Act of 1977 unconstitutional because the legislation contains a
one house veto provision. EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 U.S.L.W. 2152-53 (S.D.
Miss. 1983). Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978 was issued pursuant to the authority
of the 1977 Act and is also constitutionally vulnerable.
199. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1983).
200. For an insider's view on the background leading to the adoption of the bot-
tom line provisions of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, see
Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines, supra note 143, at 323.
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Three agencies 201 issued guidelines that relied on the bottom line
focus to determine adverse impact. These agencies generally
would not prosecute unless such discriminatory end results were
present.20 2 The EEOC, on the other hand, informally took the
position that the bottom line principle was legally inappropriate20 3
and reserved the option of prosecuting employers that used un-
validated selection components, even if the employer's overall
work force was racially and sexually balanced. 2°4
By 1978, the agencies reached agreement and the new Uni-
form Guidelines reflected the bottom line approach as a matter of
policy, if not of law.20 5 The enforcement agencies announced
that, in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion, they would
ordinarily institute actions only against employers who failed the
bottom line test and thus "whose practices have restricted or ex-
cluded the opportunities of minorities and women. ' '2°6 The agen-
cies made clear, however, that their position was not predicated on
the "underlying question of law" 20 7 but instead was a means of
allocating limited government resources in a sensible way. Con-
sistent with their reluctance to express a view as to the legal pro-
priety of the bottom line principle, the agencies reserved the right
to intervene in certain exceptional cases, notwithstanding the fact
that the employer's policies satisfied the bottom line test.208 The
See also Report by the United States General Accounting Office, 2 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) 5062 (July 30, 1982).
201. The three agencies that relied on the bottom line principle to determine the
existence of group adverse impact were the Departments of Justice and Labor and the
Civil Service Commission. The enforcement functions of the Civil Service Commis-
sion relating to equal opportunity in federal employment were later transferred to the
EEOC. See supra note 198.
202. "If... the total selection process for a job has no adverse impact, the indi-
vidual component of the selection process need not be evaluated separately for ad-
verse impact." Federal Executive Agency Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734, 51,737 (Dep't of Justice); 51,745 (Dep't of Labor);
51,753 (Civil Service Comm'n) (1976).
203. See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines, supra note
143, at 330-31.
204. See Section 1607.3 of the 1970 EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures (republished the day after the FEA Guidelines were published), 41 Fed.
Reg. 51,984 (1976).
205. Supplementary Information, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,291 (1978).
206. 1d.
207. Id. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), the arm
of the Department of Labor responsible for administering Executive Order 11246 (see
supra note 198), has declared that Teal does not repudiate the position of the Uni-
form Guidelines and that it will continue to rely on the bottom line standard in exer-
cising its prosecutorial discretion to institute actions against government contractors.
OFCCP Order No. 660f12, Transmittal No. 26, reprinted in 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 5078 (Jan. 4, 1983).
208. Section 4C of the Uniform Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4C (1983), states
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intragovernmental tension over application of the bottom line
principle persisted up to the moment Teal was decided. In an
amicus brief which the EEOC refused to join,20 9 the Justice De-
partment argued that employers should be able to rely on the bot-
tom line principle as a legal defense.
The turbulence in the federal agencies was reproduced in the
lower courts, which struggled with the bottom line question in a
variety of contexts. Unlike the federal agencies, however, the
lower courts did not have the luxury of refraining from judgment
as to the legality of the bottom line principle. The majority of
courts endorsed the bottom line approach, 21 0 particularly when
the challenged selection component either did not operate as a
pass/fail barrier to securing employment benefits2" or was offset
by a conscious affirmative action program instituted by the
employer.212
Unquestionably, the Second Circuit's decision in Teal repre-
sented the strongest expression of sentiment in opposition to the
bottom line focus. The Second Circuit, however, was not alone in
questioning the propriety of the principle in particular contexts. 213
that in the following circumstances employers are expected to validate an individual
component of a selection process for adverse impact and the failure to do so may
result in enforcement action:
(1) [w]here the selection procedure is a significant factor in the continu-
ation of patterns of assignments of incumbent employees caused by
prior discriminatory employment practices, (2) where the weight of
court decisions or administrative interpretations hold that a specific
procedure (such as height or weight requirements or no-arrest records)
is not job related in the same or similar circumstances. In unusual cir-
cumstances, other than those listed in (1) and (2) above, the Federal
enforcement agencies may request a user to evaluate the individual
components for adverse impact and may, where appropriate, take en-
forcement action with respect to the individual component.
209. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at I n. 1, Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982).
210. See, e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980);
EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger,
588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Rule v. International Ass'n of Ironworkers Local 396, 568
F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 934, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 933 (1976). Cf. Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976), reh "g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977) (holding that if the overall examination
procedure produces disparate results, defendant cannot rebut such a bottom line by
fragmenting the process and establishing that no disparate impact stems from sepa-
rate component parts).
211. Rule, 568 F.2d at 565 n.10; Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp.
1131, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1973), afj'd, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 933 (1976); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756, 771
(E.D. Va. 1978).
212. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d at 990; Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv.
Board, 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (D. Conn. 1979).
213. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F.
Supp. 873, 895 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The Santa Ana court declared that the bottom line
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The boldness of Teal lay in the refusal to permit an employer who
engaged in affirmative action to insulate itself completely from Ti-
tle VII liability.214 The other courts that had been unenthusiastic
in their reception of the bottom line principle had not grappled
with an employer's conscious use of affirmative action as an offset-
ting device. They had been concerned, instead, with unexplained
discrepancies between the expected effect of a challenged test or
other selection device and the seemingly balanced character of the
results of a defendant's overall selection process.215
The Supreme Court's decisions prior to Teal216 also reflected
at least a limited approval of the bottom line focus similar to the
qualified acceptance of the bottom line principle given by the
agencies and most lower courts. Two decisions especially difficult
to square with the Court's position in Teal are Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters217 and Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 2 18
In Furnco, three qualified black bricklayers challenged the
principle was at odds with its conception of Title VII as protecting individuals, rather
than groups, from discrimination. However, in Santa Ana, the apparent bottom line
balance, as measured by applicant flow data, was most probably due to the chilling
effect of the challenged height and education requirements. Id. at 882.
214. Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd and remanded,
457 U.S. 440 (1982).
215. I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 26 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) $ 31,870 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 963-70 (D.D.C. 1980),
aft'd, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of
Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 894-95 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
216. Three other Supreme Court opinions might also be read to provide some
implicit support for the bottom line principle. In both Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), and New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the
Court took a very lenient view of intensity of the showing an employer must make to
justify use of a practice that produce adverse impact. It could be argued that the
Court's willingness to give credence to the employer's defense in these cases may have
been attributable to the claimant's failure to convince the Court that the challenged
practice produced overall adverse results. In Davis, the Court noted that the racial
makeup of the employer's work force "might be roughly equivalent to the racial
makeup of the surrounding community, broadly conceived .. " 426 U.S. at 237.
In Beazer, the Court recognized that the defendant employed more than twice the
percentage of blacks and Hispanics than were represented in the New York Metropol-
itan labor force. 440 U.S. at 584 n.25. Similarly, the Court's decision in County of
Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), is most compatible with acceptance of a
bottom line focus. The lower court in that case enjoined the defendant from using
an unvalidated written civil service examination that had an adverse effect on minori-
ties. The defendant then tempered the overall effect of the exam by incorporating
other affirmative action-oriented components into the hiring process. Given these re-
forms, the Court declared the case moot, again apparently accepting the propriety of
focusing on overall hiring results. 440 U.S. at 631-32. See Note, Rebutting the Griggs
Prima Facie Case Under Title VIIP Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive 41ter-
natives, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1981). For a discussion of Washington v. Davis as
a bottom line case, see Blumrosen, Developments in Equal Employment Opportunity
Law--1976, 36 FED. B.J. 55, 62-64 (1977).
217. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
218. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
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defendant company's hiring system of refusing to hire at the gate
and selecting only persons known to the job superintendent as ex-
perienced or "who had been recommended to him as similarly
skilled. ' 219 Without more, the company's word of mouth system
would have produced a disproportionately low number of black
hirees, because most of the workers with whom the superintendent
was familiar were white. 220 Prompted by past charges of discrimi-
nation, however, the company engaged in effective affirmative ac-
tion efforts which resulted in a work force exceeding the
predictable number of blacks, given the racial composition of the
relevant labor force.22'
For all but two members222 of the Court, the bottom line hir-
ing figures were enough to dispense with the plaintiffs' disparate
impact challenge. The Court instead concentrated almost exclu-
sively on why the plaintiffs should not prevail on their disparate
treatment claim.223
If the bottom line question did not strike so closely at the
heart of the concept of equality under Title VII, it would have
been safe to regard Furnco as a clear, albeit implicit, endorsement
of the bottom line principle by the Supreme Court.224 When
stripped of the merely coincidental factual peculiarity that the af-
firmative action measures in Furnco took the same non-objective
form, i e., word of mouth recruiting, as the challenged hiring prac-
tice, the problem presented in Furnco is not materially different
from that posed in Teal. Both cases involved correcting or offset-
ting affirmative action efforts that failed to reach that subclass of
blacks who were shut out of the selection process at the outset-by
failing to pass the written examination in Teal; by not appearing
on the superintendent's initial list in Furnco. The cases are also
factually analogous because the disappointed minority applicants
in each were faced with a system that excluded individuals who
were arguably qualified to perform the work, simply because they
were not included within the minority pool subject to affirmative
219. 438 U.S. at 569-70.
220. Id. at 580 n.9.
221. A study conducted by the local labor union showed that 13.7% of the union
members were black. For the job in question, 20% of the bricklayers hired by Furnco
were black and 13.3% of the man-days were worked by black bricklayers. Id. at 571
n.2.
222. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the Court's treatment of plain-
tiff's disparate impact claim. Id. at 581.
223. The Court held that the Court of Appeals had erred in equating a prima facie
showing under McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, with an ultimate finding of un-
lawful discrimination. The Court also faulted the lower court for imposing alterna-
tive hiring practices upon the defendant employer, absent proof of discriminatory
intent. Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 576-77.
224. Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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action. In fact, Furnco can be distinguished from Teal only by
focusing narrowly on the Furnco plaintiffs' failure to quantify the
disproportionate effects that a subjective hiring process would
tend to have on minority workers and to establish that the plain-
tiffs were likely to be foreclosed from the affirmative action pool
on a more permanent basis.225
The Court's implicit endorsement of the bottom line principle
in Furnco was foreshadowed by an earlier, although equally
veiled, approval in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.226 The
selection procedure challenged in Espinoza was a prohibition
against hiring aliens. The plaintiff, an alien of Mexican descent,
logically claimed that the procedure was likely to have a discrimi-
natory effect on persons of Mexican descent. In rejecting the
plaintiff's claim, the Supreme Court first declared that the prohibi-
tion against national origin discrimination in Title VII was not
intended to encompass discrimination based only on alienage.227
The Court then pointed to "bottom line" figures that disclosed
that over 95% of defendant's work force were U.S. citizens of
Mexican descent. 228 Again, the fact that the citizenship require-
ment obviously would have a disproportionate tendency to ex-
clude persons of Mexican descent was overshadowed by the actual
hiring picture. Thus, the bottom line principle provided implicit
support for the Court's rationale in Espinoza as well as Furnco.
225. In subjective hiring cases, however, bottom line figures, ie., the overall re-
suits of defendant's subjective processes, are often the only data source to which
plaintiff may point to support its claim of adverse impact. In these subjective hiring
cases, it may be impossible to quantify separately the effects of the "components" of
the hiring process. Furnco was thus an unusual case in that plaintiffs could point to
the superintendent's list as a "subjective" component that independently tended to
select workers in a discriminatory manner.
Although there has been some reluctance to apply disparate impact analysis to
test the validity of discretionary policies, e.g., Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 898-99
(3d Cir. 1980), the nature of disparate impact theory does not foreclose such an appli-
cation. Professors Baldus and Cole explain:
[U]nder present law once a plaintiff can show that a discretionary selec-
tion process has produced a substantial disproportionate impact, an in-
ference of disparate treatment will arise unless the defendant can
demonstrate that legitimate factors produced the disparity. When this
showing is made, the logic of the disparate impact doctrine requires a
justification of the demonstrated causal factors, whatever their nature.
In short, any rule or procedure which can refute an inference of inten-
tional discrimination should be a proper subject of attack under a dis-
parate impact theory.
D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at § 1.23. See, e.g., Hung Ping Wang v. Hoff-
man, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact theory available to challenge
subjective hiring decisions).
226. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
227. Id. at 91.
228. Id. at 93.
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2. Connecticut v. Teal
In rejecting the bottom line principle, the majority in Teal
relied less on precedent than on its view of the conception of
equality embodied in Title VII, as gleaned principally from the
language and legislative history of the Act. Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion stressed that the guarantee of equality in Section
703(a)(2) of Title VII centered on individuals rather than
groups229 and protected each individual from discrimination, re-
gardless of the fate of other members of the plaintiff's racial
group.230 For Justice Brennan, the equality of opportunity prom-
ised by Title VII meant that each individual black employee who
sought promotion must have "the opportunity to compete equally
with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria."23'
In the majority's view, adoption of the bottom line principle
would clash with the concern of Griggs that minority workers not
be handicapped by unvalidated selection devices that operate as
barriers in the form of "built-in headwinds" against securing
equal opportunities.232 The Court reasoned that Griggs supported
the decision to measure adverse impact at the testing or "compo-
nent" stage, rather than to focus on the more comprehensive
measure of the effect of the overall selection process. 233 By care-
fully scrutinizing even isolated components of a selection proce-
dure that operate to deny individual minority members the chance
to compete for a job, the majority believed that it was adhering to
the interpretation of discrimination most faithful to the guarantee
of Section 703(a)(2). For the majority, the critical aspect of Sec-
tion 703(a)(2) is that it speaks "not in terms of jobs and promo-
tions, but in terms of limitations and classifications that would
deprive any individual of employment opportunities .,234
The most notable feature of the majority opinion lies in a
coupling of the Court's continued approval of the use of disparate
impact theory of liability with its endorsement of an individual-
centered conception of equality. The Brennan opinion in Teal,
although interpreting a theory of liability based on adverse group
impact, nonetheless regards Griggs as enforcing a kind of competi-
tive equality among individuals in the workplace. 235 Teal's imple-
229. Teal, 457 U.S. at 453-54.
230. Id. at 454.
231. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).
232. Id. at 448-49 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432).
233. Id. at 448-49.
234. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court indicated that
it might be more willing to support a bottom line focus if § 703(a)(1), see supra text
accompanying note 94, were the sole protection given to applicants and employees.
Id. at 448 n.9.
235. Id. at 453-55.
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mentation of this conception of equality adopts an essential part
of the conceptual framework of disparate treatment analysis,
while differing in result from the disparate treatment cases. 236
Teal differs from the disparate treatment cases because the re-
quirement of validation goes beyond enforcing merely the equal
application of employment rules. Teal mandates that the rules of
job competition be valid-as evidenced by proof of job related-
ness237-as well as equally applied. As in the disparate treatment
cases, however, the majority in Teal bases its analysis on a con-
ception of equality of opportunity that is largely divorced from
the number of jobs and promotions minorities as a class actually
attain. The Teal validation requirement, when implemented, will
not necessarily generate additional employment benefits for mi-
norities.238 In sum, the majority rejected the bottom line focus not
simply because it preferred, as a matter of policy, that Connecticut
rely on validation rather than affirmative action to comply with
Title VII. Rather, the majority's result is based on a belief that the
bottom line principle is inconsistent with a single, individually-
oriented competitive conception of equality that the Court pur-
ports to find embodied in Title VII.239
The majority's overarching view of Title VII fueled Justice
Powell's dissent in Teal. The dissenters charged that the major-
ity's repudiation of the bottom line principle was "inconsistent
with the very nature of disparate impact claims .... ,,240 The
dissenters did not quarrel with the majority's view that in the long
run Title VII is designed to protect individuals, not groups. In
their view, however, acceptance of this basic premise did not dis-
credit the bottom line principle. 24' Instead, the dissenters claimed
236. For a discussion of the individual conception of equality enforced through
the disparate treatment theory of liability, see supra text accompanying notes 114-42.
237. For a discussion of the technique of validation, see supra note 11.
238. The Teal majority placed considerable emphasis on a notion of equality of
individual "opportunity," as evidenced by its use of the word in italicized form eight
times. For the majority, equality of employment opportunity was equated with pro-
viding an opportunity to compete for employment benefits, rather than in the sense of
providing actual employment benefits that would in turn create opportunities to
achieve equal economic status. Teal, 457 U.S. at 450-51.
239. Teal's endorsement of an individually-oriented conception of equality has
subsequently been relied upon to invalidate the use of sex-differentiated mortality
tables in determining monthly annuity benefits. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Assoc., 691 F.2d 1054, 1062 (2d Cir. 1982) (appeal pending). The Spirt panel viewed
Teal as consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Manhart invalidated a rule requir-
ing women employees to make larger contributions to an employer-run pension plan.
In contrast to Teal, both Spirt and Manhart involved explicit disparate treatment
based on sex and no subgroup of women currently benefited from the employer's
group focus.
240. Teal, 457 U.S. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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that the flaw in the majority's reasoning stemmed from a failure to
distinguish the ultimate aims of Title VII from the two legal theo-
ries developed to achieve those aims.242 Disparate impact theory,
by definition, focuses on groups and attempts to achieve equality
for individual Title VII beneficiaries through enhanced opportu-
nities for the group.243 The dissenters considered it illogical for
the Court to allow plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case by
relying on statistics showing group disadvantage and at the same
time to ignore bottom line figures which conclusively prove that
the alleged group disadvantage does not exist.244 Justice Powell
did not explain, however, precisely how the group focus of dispa-
rate impact theory would operate to accomplish the individualistic
aim of Title VIi, nor why the majority's "conflated" conception of
the two legal theories would be less likely to achieve the ultimate
statutory aim.245
On one level, Teal seems merely to have resolved an interest-
ing problem concerning the proper treatment of conflicting sets of
statistics relevant to determining adverse impact.246 Justice Pow-
ell's theoretically-oriented dissent indicates, however, that there
was more at stake in Teal. At the heart of the bottom line issue is
a fundamental tension between what at first blush appears to be
an individual conception of equality-centered on rationalizing
selection procedures-and a group-oriented conception of equal-
ity-focused directly on expanding employment opportunities for
minorities and women in the relatively short run. Teal now is the
principal representative of the former, more process-oriented
view. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's seminal decision on
the compatibility of affirmative action with Title VII, United Steel-
workers ofAmerica v. Weber,247 although also authored by Justice
Brennan, fits more comfortably with the latter group-oriented
conception of equality.
Weber involved an unsuccessful "reverse discrimination"
challenge to Kaiser Aluminum's craft training program in which
50% of the openings were reserved for blacks until such time as
the percentage of black craftworkers approximated the racial
composition of the local labor force. 248 Kaiser's voluntary affirm-
242. Id.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 143-93.
244. Teal, 457 U.S. at 459-60.
245. Id.
246. In bottom line cases, the immediate problem is to determine whether group
adverse impact should be measured at the component stage or at the end of the selec-
tion process. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
247. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
248. The affirmative action program was instituted pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement between Kaiser and the steelworkers union that covered 15 Kaiser
plants. Prior to the establishment of the affirmative action program at the Gramercy,
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ative action for black employees was upheld, even though there
was no finding of past or present discrimination on the part of
Kaiser.249 The Supreme Court in Weber interpreted Title VII as
encouraging race conscious employer efforts designed to achieve
concrete results in the form of expanded job opportunities for the
minority group. The Court justified its result-oriented approach
by characterizing the goal of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as "the inte-
gration of blacks into the mainstream of American society" 250 and
noting that the 88th Congress believed that securing a job with "a
future" 251 was a key to such integration. For the Weber Court,
equality of employment opportunity was directly related to the ex-
pansion of jobs and other concrete employment benefits for mi-
norities. Such increased employment benefits would provide
minorities with a realistic opportunity for a more deeply rooted
integration into society. 252 The Court also regarded voluntary af-
firmative action as desirable because it accomplished the statute's
economic objectives while leaving "management prerogatives and
union freedoms . . . undisturbed to the greatest extent
possible." 253
Louisiana, plant involved in the Weber case, only 1.83% of the skilled craftworkers
were black, as compared to the local labor force, which was 39% black. The conspicu-
ous racial imbalance was due principally to Kaiser's prior policy of hiring only exper-
ienced craftworkers. Because the local unions had formerly excluded blacks, few
were able to gain the requisite experience. Id. at 197-99.
249. Id. at 199-200. It would be somewhat misleading, however, to characterize
all of Kaiser's actions relating to affirmative action as completely voluntary. In 1969,
as a result of informal pressure from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams of the Department of Labor, Kaiser began to hire blacks as unskilled workers
at the rate of one black for each white worker hired. Blumrosen, Affirmative Action,
supra note 19, at 6 n.12. In 1974, Kaiser selected employees within the plant for its
affirmative action training program for skilled workers. The selection was based on
race in order to maintain a 50/50 ratio of black to white trainees. The selection was
also based on seniority, calculated separately for the two racial groups. Id. at 6. Be-
cause most of the black incumbents chosen for the training program were hired after
1969, they had much less seniority than the whites chosen for the program. This
affirmative action plan was modeled on the settlement of employment discrimination
claims in the steel industry. Id. at 6 n.13; see United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus, the affirmative action plan was in
part generated by the efforts of the federal government and by the Title VII experi-
ence in a related industry.
250. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202.
251. Id. at 202-03.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 206 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1963)). The
Court had previously recognized the value of voluntary employer action in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), when it declared that one purpose served by
back pay awards in Title VII cases was "prophylactic." Such awards, the Court be-
lieved, would provide the "spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to
self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to elim-
inate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history." Id. at 417-18, quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
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Proponents of the bottom line principle could gain considera-
ble sustenance from Weber's strong endorsement of affirmative
action and its consequent bolstering of management prerogative
to select methods for increasing employment opportunities for mi-
norities.254 As a matter of principle and policy, Weber's endorse-
ment of voluntary affirmative action fits with the bottom line
focus. An employer who provides at least a proportionate number
of employment benefits for blacks may be said to have contrib-
uted to Title VII's objective of expanding employment opportuni-
ties for minorities, despite the use of a selection device that
ordinarily would have a tendency to select in a discriminatory pat-
tern. Additionally, the bottom line principle reinforces manage-
ment prerogative by permitting the employer to decide the best
way to achieve the goal of equal opportunity without sacrificing
other imperatives of the business. For the employer, the bottom
line focus provides an alternative to validating individual selec-
tion components and thus may limit the necessity for government
intrusion to enforce equality rights for Title VII beneficiaries.
Weber was not discussed by the Court in Teal.255 The major-
ity may have believed, however, that one critical distinction over-
shadowed any theoretical and practical kinship between Weber
and the bottom line defense proposed in Teal. The key difference
between Weber and the bottom line issue in Teal is that the af-
firmative action program in Teal failed to promote the interests of
a certain subclass of blacks. The defendant in Teal selected only
blacks who passed the initial written examination without ade-
quately justifying the criteria by which this subgroup was selected.
The challenge in Weber, in contrast, was pressed by a white em-
ployee and did not seem to present a significant potential for
harming a subclass of blacks. 256
F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
44 (1974) ("Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred
means of achieving the goals of Title VII."); Smith v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 685
F.2d 164, 169 (6th Cir. 1982); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 554 (6th
Cir. 1982) ("a principal purpose of Title VII is to induce voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action").
254. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra note 19, at 45; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
255. The State of Connecticut and the United States had, however, cited Weber in
brief in support of the bottom line focus. Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
256. The Kaiser affirmative action plan promised to afford a substantial percent-
age of black employees the opportunity to become skilled workers. The selections for
the trainees were made from incumbent unskilled workers at the Gramercy plant,
approximately 15% of whom were black. Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra note
19, at 6. Under the affirmative action plan, trainees were selected at the rate of at
least one black for every white until the percentage of black skilled workers was equal
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When thus placed alongside Weber, the most problematic as-
pect of Teal lies in the Court's willingness to accord controlling
weight to the interests of individual minority workers, even at the
cost of reducing employer incentive to adopt voluntary affirmative
action plans that would benefit the entire group. When the inter-
est of individual white male workers is pitted against affirmative
action, Weber tips the balance in favor of the minority group in-
terest and simultaneously reinforces management discretion to
choose between validation and affirmative action to achieve em-
ployment equality.257
The Court's decision in Teal to subordinate affirmative action
to the interests of individual minority group members weakens the
incentive for employers like Kaiser to opt for affirmative action as
the means to achieve employment equality. After Teal, affirma-
tive action, even if successful, may not immunize the employer
from disparate impact liability under Title VII. Validation is now
the only compliance technique which, theoretically at least, insu-
lates the employer from Title VII disparate impact liability in
dealing with all groups, whites as well as minorities.258
Teal poses an irony for those who regard affirmative action as
the preferred means of achieving the equality of employment op-
portunity described in Weber. As a compliance technique, valida-
tion, at best, assures only that the process for selecting employees
will be geared toward "merit." Particularly in the short run, vali-
dation may actually operate to the economic disadvantage of mi-
to the percentage of blacks in the local labor force (approximately 39%). 443 U.S. at
8-99. The comparatively high percentage of blacks needed to meet the 50/50 ratio
requirement under the apprenticeship program thus diminished the chance that a sig-
nificant number of incumbent black employees would be unable to take advantage of
the affirmative action plan.
257. The majority in Weber did indicate, however, that employers were not free to
choose any conceivable form of affirmative action. Although not purporting to "de-
fine in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirma-
tive action plans," the Court noted that the Kaiser plan was acceptable because it: (a)
was "designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy;" (b)
did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees;" (c) did not create
"an absolute bar to advancement of white employees;" and (d) was a "temporary
measure" not "intended to maintain a racial balance." 443 U.S. at 208-09. Some
affirmative action plans have failed the Weber standards. Eg., Kromnick v. School
Dist., 555 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (quota used solely to maintain existing racial
balance held invalid); Jurgens v. Thomas, 29 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1561,
1581 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (affirmative action plans held invalid because the employer,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, had no history of discrimination
and no statistical disparity existed between the employer's work force and the avail-
able labor force); Lehman v. Yellow Freight System, 26 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS.
(BNA) 75, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1981) (informal decision to favor black applicant held inva-
lid because the employer was not attempting to remedy a statistical disparity between
representation of blacks in the labor force and employer's workforce, and plan could
not be considered a temporary measure).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32.
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norities 259-a consequence not generally associated with
affirmative action. The "liberal" majority supported affirmative
action in Weber in order to advance the economic status of blacks,
yet was unwilling to create further incentives to such voluntary
affirmative efforts in Teal. Instead, it insisted on validation, re-
gardless of the offsetting results attributable to the employer's af-
firmative action program.
It thus seems fair to draw one of two conclusions from Teal.
It is possible that the "liberal" majority did not believe that a pref-
erence for validation would, in the long run, operate to disadvan-
tage the economic interests of protected groups. Alternatively, the
majority may have concluded that such disadvantage is the cost of
remaining faithful to the balance between equality interests and
business needs envisioned in Title VII. To assess whether this
preference for validation over affirmative action is supported by
the theory or policies behind Title VII, it is useful first to consider
the reach of the majority's holding in Teal260 and then to examine
the principal theoretical26' and policy 262 arguments that surround
the bottom line debate.
B. Title VII's Objectives and the Demise of the Bottom Line
1. The Reach of the Teal Requirement of Validation
Although the Teal majority fundamentally disagreed with the
bottom line principle in theory, it limited its holding to cases in
which the challenged selection component operates as a pass/fail
barrier to employment, rather than simply as a portion of a cumu-
lative selection process. 263 The plaintiffs in Teal who failed the
unvalidated test were automatically eliminated from the pool of
those eligible for promotion at that early stage. 264 The Court care-
fully avoided expressing any opinion regarding the legality of a
selection process in which an unvalidated test operates as only one
of several selection measures and the applicant is not required to
pass the one test in order to be selected.265
259. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 60, at 238-39; Lerner, supra note 11, at 41; Note,
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. Compromises and Contro-
versies, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 605, 630-33 (1979).
260. See infra text accompanying notes 263-74.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 275-313.
262. See infra text accompanying notes 314-47.
263. Teal, 457 U.S. at 445, 452.
264. Id. at 442-44. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
265. Justice Powell's dissent interpreted the majority's ruling as governing only
pass/fail barriers and suggested that employers could easily circumvent the ruling by
using a cumulative selection process in which applicants were allowed to compete at
all stages of the process:
[E]mployers may integrate consideration of test results into one overall
hiring decision based on that "factor" and additional factors. Such a
19831
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By so limiting its holding in Teal, the Court may have tacitly
accepted the position of the Second Circuit that drew a sharp dis-
tinction between pass/fail barriers and other less preclusive selec-
tion obstacles.266 Echoing Justice Powell's famous opinion in
Board of Regents v. Bakke,267 the Second Circuit had stressed that
its holding in Teal did not conflict with other lower court holdings
refusing to permit Griggs-based challenges to a mere component
or subtest that constituted only a portion of a cumulative selection
procedure. 268 The Second Circuit distinguished those instances in
which an offsetting factor-most often an affirmative action
plan-is applied to all the candidates and not simply to a separate
class of applicants who survive an initial pass/fail barrier. In such
cases, the Second Circuit would not regard the emphasis on bot-
tom line results as unfair because all minority applicants have had
a chance to benefit from the affirmative action plan.269
The Second Circuit's reasoning is certainly compatible with
the narrow holding of the Supreme Court in Teal. However, be-
cause the Supreme Court failed to decide the issue expressly, the
question of the proper reach of Teal will continue to plague the
lower courts. Moreover, upon closer analysis of the problem, it
indeed appears likely that Teal may not be restricted only to
pass/fail barriers. Rather, as explained below, the more persua-
sive position is that the Teal validation requirement should apply
to all significant components of a selection procedure, whether or
not they operate as pass/fail barriers to selection.270
In one respect at least, some limited adherence to a bottom
line approach is unavoidable. No court would require each and
every component of a selection procedure including, for example,
individual test questions, to be scrutinized separately for disparate
process would not, even under the Court's reasoning, result in a finding
of discrimination on the basis of disparate impact unless the actual hir-
ing decisions had a disparate impact on the minority group.
Id. at 463-64 n.8.
266. Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'dsub nom., 457
U.S. 440 (1982).
267. 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978).
268. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 374 F. Supp.
1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823 (1976); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934 (1976).
269. Teal, 645 F.2d at 138-39. The Court of Appeals also argued that, in contrast
to a cumulative selection process setting, it saw little justification for a court to refuse
to review the isolated effects of a pass/fail component because both the component
and the affected individuals are "readily identifiable." Id. at 139.
270. Pre-Teal lower court decisions on both sides of the bottom line controversy
have expressed disapproval of drawing the line at pass/fail barriers. See, e.g., Brown
v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (D. Conn. 1979) (approving
bottom line principle); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410
F. Supp. 873, 895 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (rejecting the bottom line principle).
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impact.2 71 Judicial efficiency demands the imposition of some
reasonable limitation on the kind of components that may be
challenged. Beyond that limitation, however, considerations of
judicial management of Title VII cases do little to dictate the ex-
tent to which a bottom line focus must be employed.
Drawing a line between a component that is simply cumula-
tive and one that operates as a barrier to further consideration is
conceptually unsound.272 To a disappointed applicant, falling just
shy of the acceptable grade on a test that constitutes an important,
but not preclusive, portion of the selection process has the same
practical effect as not making it through a pass/fail screening de-
vice consisting solely of a test. Moreover, if the candidate's rejec-
tion is arguably related to race-linked qualification, there is no
logic to predicating liability solely on the place the component oc-
cupies in the selection process.
Limiting challenges to pass/fail barriers may be an efficient
judicial management tool to confine attacks on employment pro-
cedures. Such restriction, however, cannot be justified on any
other principle. Although the use of selection components that do
not amount to pass/fail barriers may seem fairer at first glance,
because they do not create readily identifiable subcategories of
minority candidates, the distinction is primarily cosmetic.
For example, suppose an employer uses both a written test
and a scored interview-neither of which has been validated-as
the bases for its hiring decisions. If the test has a disproportionate
impact on blacks, the employer might decide to offset the adverse
impact by incorporating affirmative action into the interview com-
ponent of the process and systematically giving higher ratings to
271. See Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934 (1976); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (D. Conn.
1975); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 374 F. Supp. 1361,
1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976).
272. In constitutional challenges to admissions procedures of educational institu-
tions, similar arguments have been made regarding the conceptual unsoundness of
differentiating between an affirmative action quota and a less stark form of affirma-
tive action whereby minority applicants are simply afforded a "plus" based on their
race. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Why Bakke Has No Case, NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKs, Nov. 10, 1977, at I 1 (Affirmative action quota program, challenged in Bakke,
is in principle no different than plans that merely permit a candidate's race to count
affirmatively in the admissions process); Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and
Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 28 (1979) (affording a
"plus" to a minority applicant can operate as a decisive factor "blurring the borders
of preference" yet maintaining intact its racial substance); Voros, Three Views of
Equal Protection. A Backdrop to Bakke, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 25, 72 (the inescapable
result of the admission of a minority student when the "plus" makes the difference is
the exclusion of a non-minority applicant on a purely racial basis). See also Justice
Brennan's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 378.
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black interviewees. Such an affirmative action plan could be im-
plemented in at least two ways. Using one approach, the em-
ployer might decide that passing the written test will be a
prerequisite or pass/fail barrier to obtaining an interview. In or-
der to obtain a representative number of blacks and to counteract
the adverse impact of the test, the employer might then select a
disproportionately high number of blacks from those who pass the
test and are granted an interview. Under this system, black candi-
dates who failed the test would have no chance to make it up on
the interview and would be ineligible for inclusion in the affirma-
tive action pool. Alternatively, the employer might choose to help
black candidates by giving them higher ratings on the interview,
but to interview all those applying and then weigh the test and
interview equally. Under this alternative, a black applicant who
scored very low on the test thus might still have a chance of being
hired by achieving a very high score on the interview.
In the latter cumulative component case, the black applicant
who, for all practical purposes, "fails" the test may feel less the
victim of an unfair hiring process than the black who failed the
test under the pass/fail system. Under the cumulative system, the
applicant has a chance to make up the negative impact of one
unvalidated procedure by scoring well on another unvalidated de-
vice. In both cases, however, the employer has in fact created a
preferred subclass of blacks without justifying the criterion for se-
lection. In the pass/fail situation, the preferred subclass is limited
to blacks who pass the test; in the cumulative component setting,
the preferred subclass consists of blacks who do well on the exam
or who score very high on the interview. In each, there will be
blacks who are excluded because they do not fall into what is an
arguably unjustifiable preferred subclass. Assuming that both the
test and the interview are not job-related-recall that neither com-
ponent has been validated-it is no fairer in principle to exclude a
potentially qualified individual from a job based on two suspect
hiring measures rather than merely on one.
Once the legitimacy, in principle, of permitting challenges to
merely cumulative components of a selection process is acknowl-
edged, it is difficult to see how concerns of judicial administration
alone justify limiting scrutiny to pass/fail barriers. Instead, all
significant components of a testing procedure, whether labeled
subtests or not, should be vulnerable to a disparate impact chal-
lenge. This vulnerability to challenge should be subject only to
the limitation that courts will not waste their time passing judg-
ment on insignificant aspects of the total process.2 73 Analyzing
273. In addition to the unsoundness of drawing a distinction between pass/fail
barriers and cumulative components as a matter of principle, there may be practical
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the theoretical and practical soundness of Teal's validation re-
quirement, therefore, is all the more imperative because Teal's
holding is relevant in principle to all disparate impact challenges
to employee selection devices. 274
2. Validation and Disparate Impact Theory
As discussed above, 275 the Teal majority justified its rejection
of the bottom line principle by resort to an individually-oriented
conception of equality. In the majority view, only by requiring
the validation of isolated selection devices that possess the ten-
dency to select in a discriminatory manner could the courts en-
force Title VII's guarantee of equal opportunity for individuals.
276
In addition to associating the validation requirement with equal
opportunity and individual rights, the majority opinion rhetori-
cally aligned the bottom line focus to a quota-like defense that
might place a ceiling on employment opportunities for blacks.
The majority suspected that the bottom line principle could unjus-
tifiably serve to insulate from liability those employers who dis-
criminate against some blacks and then try to justify their actions
reasons for preferring pass/fail barriers as the more efficient affirmative action tool.
The employer who uses a test as a pass/fail screening device for the interview may
fairly readily calculate how many of the minorities who passed the test must be hired
to obtain its overall goal. In contrast, the employer whose affirmative action "plus" is
potentially available to all minority candidates by use of a cumulative process may
well have to wait until the end of a lengthy and costly interview process to determine
which minority members will be the beneficiaries of affirmative action or risk racial
imbalance in its overall hiring result. The more stark, separate track form of affirma-
tive action thus may serve the employer's desire for an efficient system that guarantees
results. See Brief of the National League of Cities and the National Public Employer
Labor Relations Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 27-28,
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
274. Two post-Teal cases have raised the question of whether the Teal validation
requirement should govern challenges to selection criteria applied to an all-female
applicant pool. These cases most dramatically pose the question of whether the right
embraced in Teal should be viewed as a process-oriented right of fair procedures,
regardless of the preordained outcome. In Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983), the en banc court held Teal inapplicable and refused to require validation of a
minimum height requirement. The height requirement was used in a round of hiring
decisions designed to select a female police officer needed to perform special duties
related to female prisoners. Reversing the panel decision, 694 F.2d 876 (1st Cir.
1982), the court reasoned that Teal should not control unless there was competition
between men and women for the desired job benefit. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines,
Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1534 (1983),
dealt with the application of a weight requirement as a condition of employment for
flight hostesses, a position held only by women. Id. at 603. The majority did not
reach the question of the applicability of Teal but invalidated the requirement as a
form of intentional disparate treatment. Id. at 605. The dissent argued that Teal was
inapplicable in the single sex job context. Id. at 611-12 (9th Cir. 1982) (Farris, J.,
dissenting).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 229-39.
276. 457 U.S. at 453-56.
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by pointing to the more favorable treatment of other blacks. 277
Undoubtedly, the most devastating charge that may be levied
against the bottom line principle 278 is that it reflects a rigid con-
ception of equality that rests solely on results as measured by the
number of employment benefits secured by minority groups.
From Griggs onward, the Court has maintained that Title VII was
not designed to force an equality of group representation in the
workplace. 279 Instead, the Court in Title VII cases purportedly
enforces the more neutral view, first articulated in Griggs, that
"[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority,
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. '280
The cases seem to endorse the "merit" ideal under which
every individual has an equal opportunity to compete for employ-
ment benefits based on qualifications and is not guaranteed a job
simply because of race or sex.281 Furthermore, as noted earlier,28 2
the legislative history of the Act provides some support for this
neutral, merit-based view in statements that the merit system is
277. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455-56 (1982). This fear of abuse of the
bottom line principle by ill-intentioned employers was echoed in the amicus brief of
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Amicus suggested that the ra-
tionale of the bottom line principle might insulate an employer who hires only light-
skinned blacks, excluding dark-skinned blacks, provided that a sufficient number of
blacks are hired. Presaging the sentiment of the majority, amicus contended that no
distinction should be drawn between the employer who purposefully discriminates on
the basis of race and tries to shield itself by pointing to favorably balanced overall
results and the well-intentioned employer who engages in affirmative action to offset
the adverse effects of an unvalidated selection device. Brief for the Lawyers' Commit-
tee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-10,
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
278. For a discussion of two possible advantages of rejecting the bottom line prin-
ciple, see infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Wa-
ters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 709 (1978); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
280. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (1971).
281. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971); Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80
(1978); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977); McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800--04 (1973); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 348-49 & n.31 (1977).
The concept or principle of merit, like the concept of equality, has been de-
scribed as an "essentially contestable concept" that is capable of supporting a variety
of conceptions, depending on the particular function served by the principle. See
Fallon, To Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race.: The
Concept ofaMerit in the Law ofAntidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REv. 815, 825-29 (1980).
Fallon provides a helpful working definition of merit as "any quality or achievement,
typically regarded as an indication of excellence, that makes fitting the bestowal of
some desired benefit or reward." Id. at 815 n.I.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
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good for business as well as protective of minority interests. 283 In
this view, reliance on merit protects business from the inefficiency
and stagnation attributable to a rigid quota system, which argua-
bly would tend to discourage workers from striving for advance-
ment through increased productivity. 284
This general acceptance of a merit system and correlative dis-
approval of a legally mandated quota system, however, cannot be
simplistically translated into a persuasive argument against either
the bottom line principle or other result-oriented compliance tech-
niques such as voluntary affirmative action. Congress expressly
incorporated its dislike for quotas in only one narrow provision of
Title VII. The prohibition of Section 7030) serves only to prevent
employers from being compelled to give preferential treatment to
any individual or group solely on account of a racial imbalance in
the work force.285 The prohibition by no means reaches the use of
quotas for all purposes.286 Indeed, judicially imposed quotas
designed to remedy unlawful discrimination 287 and affirmative ac-
283. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13088, reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 3107 (comments of Senator Humphrey).
284. For a thoughtful view of the merit principle as justified only by considera-
tions of efficiency or productivity, and not for moral notions of desert, see Daniels,
Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 207 (1978). See also Fallon, supra note
281, at 838; Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L.
REV. 955, 961-62 (1974); Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and
Affirmative Action, Pt. 1, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 472-78 (1981)
(statement of Joe R. Feagin, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of Texas) (ar-
guing that affirmative action efforts do not destroy normal meritocratic procedures in
organizations).
285. Section 7030) provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to re-
quire any employer. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individ-
ual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by an em-
ployer. .. in comparison with the total number or percentage of per-
sons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force
in any community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1981).
286. For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding the issues of preferen-
tial treatment and quotas of Section 7030), see Blumrosen, The Group Interest Con-
cept, supra note 5, at 126-3 1.
287. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 436-37 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), remedial order reconsidered and afl'd, 631 F.2d 469
(7th Cir. 1980); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Boston Chapter,
NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026-28 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 619-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Castro v. Beecher, 459
F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330-31 (8th Cir.
1971), modified en banc, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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tion quotas voluntarily instituted by employers to serve as insula-
tion from possible Title VII liability 288 are commonplace and
have generally fared well under attack in litigation.
Significantly, Teal's rejection of the bottom line principle
does not signal a general disapproval of using result-oriented tech-
niques to achieve Title VII compliance. Justice Brennan's opinion
did not denigrate the desirability of affirmative action quotas or
characterize the bottom line principle in such stridently disparag-
ing terms as to call into question the propriety of using result-
oriented techniques in other settings. Instead, Brennan discred-
ited the bottom line principle in Teal by a judicial insistence on
tying only validation, and not the bottom line principle, to the
equality of individual opportunity purportedly guaranteed by
Griggs and the subsequent line of disparate impact cases.2 89
The bottom line principle admittedly tends to promote af-
firmative action efforts that focus primarily on the relative status
of the group rather than solely on the qualifications of an individ-
ual.290 Nor is it inconceivable that the bottom line in some cases
might provide a haven for the discriminatory employer who seeks
to hide behind hiring or promotion statistics to limit further op-
portunities for blacks.29' But a strong theoretical argument
288. See, e.g., Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968-70 (8th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (198 1); Local Union No. 35 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 913 (1981); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 491-94
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Van Aken v. Young, 29 EMP. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 32,902 (E.D.
Mich. 1982); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 273-76, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475,
485-87, 604 P.2d 1365, 1374-76 (1980), cert. dismissed as moot, 449 U.S. 811 (1980);
Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 Pa. 470, 483-91, 412 A.2d 860, 867-71 (1980);
Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 480, 490, 599 P.2d 1255, 1261 (1979) (en
banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). For cases upholding consent decrees embod-
ying preferential remedies, see also EEOC v. AT & T Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596
F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding a conciliation agreement); United States v. Alle-
gheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, afl'd in part, vacated and re-
manded in part, on rehearing, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
289. The Teal majority insisted that the focus of the major post-Griggs impact
cases had been on the potential of the selection device to pose a barrier to employ-
ment opportunity, rather than on the bottom line results. 457 U.S. at 450 (citing
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 & n.12 (1977), Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975), and New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568, 584 (1979)). Justice Powell, in his dissent, countered by noting that none of
the cases relied on by the Court posed the question of whether balanced bottom line
results should insulate employers from Title VII liability. The dissent cited language
in Dothard and Beazer suggesting that the bottom line focus was legally sound. 457
U.S. at 460-61 & n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
290. For a discussion of the operation of the bottom line principle, see supra text
accompanying notes 26-29.
291. See supra note 277. It is now well settled, however, that a disparate treatment
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against rejecting the bottom line approach to Title VII enforce-
ment still exists: the principle is no more group-focused, no more
result-oriented, and no more destructive of the merit system than
disparate impact theory itself, which is the source of the validation
requirement imposed by Teal. Both validation and the bottom
line focus are approaches that reach beyond a concern for fair
competition between individuals and operate to remedy group in-
equities.292 Once the theoretical objections to the bottom line are
thus neutralized, the debate over the principle can be more pro-
ductively centered on its ramifications in practice.
Any formulation of disparate impact theory, once divorced
from a finding of intentional disparate treatment of individual Ti-
tle VII claimants, is fundamentally result-oriented and grounded
on a notion of group status. Griggs established that selection de-
vices which tend to pose a barrier to advancement for blacks must
be justified.293 The notion of what constitutes a barrier is defined
in terms of the adverse effect it has on the group. 294 Hence, it is
impossible for an individual minority worker to establish adverse
impact without some evidence of the effect of the selection device
on persons other than the individual plaintiff.295 The requirement
of validation in Teal remains inextricably tied to a prerequisite
showing of group adverse impact. Regardless of how unfair or
unrelated to the job the selection process may be, the individual
plaintiff, even if a member of a minority group, cannot secure re-
lief unless the unfairness may be said to exaggerate or recreate
race-based inequities that have disadvantaged the plaintiff's racial
group.296
For example, suppose a municipal police department uses an
unvalidated physical fitness test to screen applicants. An individ-
ual black male candidate who fails the test will not benefit from
Title VII unless he can show that blacks generally score less well
than whites on this measure-a difficult, if not impossible, task
because there is no evidence that physical fitness tests have an ad-
challenge is available against an employer who acts with discriminatory intent, re-
gardless of the presence of a balanced work force. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per
curiam). Thus, the danger that the bottom line principle would shield the ill-inten-
tioned employer stems not from the unavailability of a legal remedy but rather from
the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent. For a general discussion of the diffi-
culties of proving discriminatory intent, see Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent
Under Title VII. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1201 (1982).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16, 72-75, 240-45.
293. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
294. See supra note 12 for a description of the measurement of adverse impact.
295. See cases cited supra note 139.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 143-93.
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verse impact on blacks. The black applicant may justifiably be-
lieve that he has not been given a fair opportunity to secure a job
in a field traditionally dominated by whites because the rules of
the competition have not been shown to be fair, that is, job-re-
lated. For this individual, however, Title VII's guarantee of equal
opportunity will provide no remedy because, without a showing of
race-based inequality, as measured by group-oriented statistics,
the individual's claim of unfairness is not encompassed within Ti-
tle VII's limited antidiscrimination mandate. Because Title VII is
not a comprehensive fair employment law, it provides no solace
for an unselected individual unless the harm to the individual can
be traced either to intentional discrimination or group inequity.
The majority in Teal recognized and approved of the group
focus of disparate impact theory. 297  Nevertheless, the Court
sought to refine the focus by articulating the equality right secured
thereby as the right to have "the opportunity to compete equally
with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria." 298 By de-
fining the immediate goal vindicated by disparate impact theory
as fair competition under fair rules, the Court sounds as if it has
succeeded in removing any trace of preference, quota, or other
result-oriented techniques from its legal theory.
Yet the Court's neutral-sounding articulation of the goal se-
cured by impact analysis may be misleading, because it tends to
obscure any cogent explanation of how impact theory has oper-
ated to promote equality. At the outset, it must be noted that only
minority members and women have been considered entitled to
secure benefits by using disparate impact analysis. 299 Title VII
has not been "neutralized" by allowing white males to rely on dis-
parate impact theory to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.3°° Instead, the only protection traditionally afforded white
297. Teal, 457 U.S. at 448-49.
298. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).
299. E.g. the Supreme Court disparate impact cases have all dealt with claims of
minorities, see supra note 72, except for Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977),
which struck down height and weight requirements that had a discriminatory impact
upon women.
300. The Supreme Court has implied that disparate impact analysis may not be
invoked by white males. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Manhart held that a requirement that female employees
make larger contributions to a pension fund than male employees violated Title VII's
ban against disparate treatment. The Court rejected the employer's claim that to
equalize contributions would place a disproportionately heavy burden on male em-
ployees who, as a group, had a shorter life expectancy:
Even under Title VII itself-assuming disparate-impact analysis ap-
plies to fringe benefits, cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136,
144-45-the male employees would not prevail. Even a completely
neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on
one group or another. Griggs does not imply, and this Court has never
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males by Title VII is in cases in which there is proof of intentional
disparate treatment. 30'
Reserving disparate impact theory to the so-called protected
groups under Title VII makes sense in light of the ultimate goals
of the legislation. Congress in 1964 was concerned with improv-
ing the economic status of blacks and sought to halt the system-
wide discrimination which historically had relegated blacks to a
position of economic inferiority. 30 2 This Congressional objective
has not yet been achieved. Many social indicators demonstrate
that compared to white males, women and minority males have
not achieved "equality of opportunity and equity of reward. 30 3
As compared to white males, minorities are more likely to be edu-
cationally overqualified for the work they do,3° 4 earning less than
held, that discrimination must always be inferred from such
consequences.
Id. at 710 n.20.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights also takes the position that dispa-
rate impact analysis should be limited to challenges brought by minorities or women:
Founded as it is on the historical and current process of discrimination
against minorities and women, the Griggs principle cannot sensibly be
applied to white males. There is no history of discrimination against
white males because of the color of their skin or their gender, no inter-
acting individual, organizational, and structural attitudes and actions
denying white males opportunities that disadvantage them in the job
market on account of their race and/or sex.
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s:
DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION at 17 n.20 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS]. See also Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra
note 19, at 43.
But see Weisbord v. Michigan State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
Without providing reasons, the Weisbord Court refused to dismiss a suit brought by a
*white male who invoked disparate impact theory: "Viewing the pleadings liberally
the Court can not say for a certainty that plaintiff has not stated a prima facie claim
under Griggs." Id. at 1352.
301. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83
(1976) (white male employees who misappropriated cargo and were discharged, while
a black male employee, also involved in the theft, was retained, have a cause of action
under Title VII); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 231, 236 (W.D.
Tex. 1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978) (white male was paid a lower salary,
received smaller salary increases than an equally qualified black male and was
harassed because of his race); Sawyer v. Russo, 19 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 8996
(D.D.C. 1979) (black supervisors violated regulations by passing over qualified white
male for promotion in favor of lesser-qualified black applicants), cited in U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 300, at 17 n.20. The Commission noted, how-
ever, that the above disparate treatment cases represent discrimination that is "iso-
lated and not part of a self-perpetuating process of discrimination such as that
experienced by minorities and women." Id.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
303. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUAL-
ITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN 86 (1978).
304. "[BIlack males with a high school education are about 50% more likely to be
overqualified for their occupations than majority males." Id. at 17.
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comparably educated majority males, 30 5 unemployed, 30 6 exper-
iencing smaller annual increases in earnings with age, 30 7 living in
poverty,308 and living in overcrowded conditions. 30 9
White males, both historically and at present, have not been
victimized on the basis of group characteristics. There is thus lit-
tle need to use disparate impact theory on their behalf to disman-
tle neutral policies in order to provide more opportunities for the
relatively favored group. Only very rarely do facially neutral
standards have a tendency to favor blacks over whites. The only
neutral policy with such an effect that has surfaced in the caselaw
is the use of a veterans preference as a selection device. 310 Under-
standably, then, when Congress sought to eliminate barriers to
blacks in 1964, there was no similar concern for removing neutral
barriers whose only tendency was to hurt whites. Even if such
barriers existed, it is unlikely that Congress would have regarded
these devices as part of the same problem with which it was strug-
gling: to frame a law that would end the massive, systemic dis-
crimination suffered by blacks.
In sum, disparate impact analysis has been inherently one-
sided. Blacks and women may object to a test that tends to reduce
job opportunities for them. However, at least before Teal, a white
male could not successfully object under Title VII to a neutral but
non-job-related device that tended to favor blacks or women.
Once the one-sided nature of disparate impact theory is ac-
knowledged, the fair competition that Teal supposedly heralds is
placed in a different light. White employees are not protected un-
less blacks choose to assert their rights to challenge unvalidated
selection devices that have an adverse impact on blacks, thereby
incidentally rationalizing the employment processes for all work-
ers. In this one respect at least, reserving the protection of dispa-
305. For most college-educated males belonging to minority groups, earnings were
less than 85% of those of white males in 1975. Black females fared even worse than
black males. Id. at 22-23.
306. Between 1970 and 1976, a period of rising unemployment, the unemployment
of minorities and women worsened in absolute terms as well as in relation to majority
males. Over this six year period, the unemployment rate for blacks of both sexes
increased from almost twice to close to three times the unemployment rate of white
males. Id. at 29.
307. The average annual dollar increments for black males was less than half that
of white males in 1976. Black females fared even worse. Id. at 56-60.
308. Black families were over three times as likely to be living in poverty as white
families in 1975. Id. at 65.
309. "In many of the groups of minority- and female-headed households, over-
crowding occurs two to three times more frequently as in majority-headed house-
holds." Id. at 79.
310. Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), afl'din
part, rev'd in part, Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 330-31.
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rate impact theory only for minority persons must continue to
function as a kind of preference, albeit a justified preference,
given the disparity of condition of minorities in the workplace. 3"
It is probable that the courts, in an effort to reduce the intru-
sion on employer discretion, will continue to limit disparate im-
pact challenges to those brought by minorities. 312 Whenever
neutral policies are vulnerable to legal challenge, managerial dis-
cretion to choose the policies it determines to be most competi-
tively viable is thereby hampered. To keep this intrusion to a
minimum, Congress chose not to enact a fair employment law
which allowed all individual workers to compete with each other
on the basis of job related tests.313 Instead, Congress chose to fo-
cus on the most persuasive justification for authorizing judicial re-
assessment of the fairness of neutral business practices-the
unequal group status of minorities in the workplace that is the
legacy of past discrimination.
Disparate impact theory is clearly closely associated with bet-
tering the condition of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Ac-
cordingly, Teal's rejection of an employer's bottom line focus that
functions to promote a kind of group equality at the defendant's
workplace appears less defensible solely as a matter of Title VII
theory. Both the bottom line principle that the majority rejects,
and the validation approach that the majority endorses, are inex-
tricably linked to showings of group adverse impact and are thus
justified as attempts to secure individual opportunity through im-
provement in group condition. The two approaches share a con-
cern for results, and each technique tends to assess these results in
terms of the condition of the group as a whole. Neither is unques-
tionably more attuned to the spirit of Title VII than the other.
311. See supra notes 303-09 and accompanying text and infra notes 335, 347.
312. Although unlikely, it is theoretically possible that Teal will be relied upon to
permit white males to use disparate impact theory. An appealing context for expan-
sion of the application of disparate impact might be a sex discrimination case in
which a male seeks a traditionally female job. For example, suppose that an em-
ployer seeks to hire a receptionist and decides to give all applicants a non-job-related
test, such as a shorthand test. If males as a group tend to perform worse on the
shorthand test than females, the test might be challenged as discriminating against
males and the employer called upon to justify the requirement. A validation require-
ment in this instance would probably serve to eliminate use of the shorthand test and
to increase the hiring of male receptionists. It may, in general, be a wise policy to
increase the number of males in predominantly female occupations and thereby help
to remove debilitating sexual stereotypes that have harmed women in traditional
fields. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399, 415-27 (work assigned to women and
minorities has historically been devalued) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination]. With respect to the availability of disparate impact claims for whites
claiming adverse racial impact, there are few neutral selection devices (save perhaps
veteran's status) that tend to advantage blacks as a group.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 337-41.
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Both can be viewed as techniques or mechanisms designed to up-
grade the status of traditionally disadvantaged groups so that, in
the future, a nonillusory equality for individuals can be attained.
Because both techniques are compatible with the group-oriented
conception of equality underlying disparate impact theory, the
choice between the two techniques should be premised on an eval-
uation of the practical impact of each.
3. Affirmative Action, Equal Employment Opportunity, and
the Consequences of Teal for Employer Discretion
It is difficult to predict whether, in the long run, Teal's prefer-
ence for validation will best cure the inferior economic status of
minority groups and thereby help to create a future in which
meaningful equality may be secured for all individuals. Teal's in-
sistence on validation of individual components may be a wise
preventive measure, cautiously designed to ferret out any possibly
significant barrier to equal employment opportunity that should
trigger justification. For example, the validation requirement of
Teal could conceivably promote minority interests by providing
additional protection against subtle forms of disparate treat-
ment.314 Moreover, the Teal requirement of validation also as-
sures that the bottom line defense will not be abused by employers
claiming insulation from Title VII disparate impact liability in
cases in which there is no satisfactory explanation for an apparent
bottom line balance, given the adverse impact of a component of
the selection process. 31 5
This favorable assessment of the Teal ruling will not hold,
314. Although it is clear that a balanced work force does not insulate the employer
who intentionally disfavors individual workers because of their race or sex, see supra
note 291, such disparate treatment may often be hard to prove, given the elusive ele-
ment of discriminatory motivation. Requiring validation, despite a bottom line bal-
ance, may serve to eliminate the more subtle attempts to deprive certain minority
members of employment benefits. Such a situation might occur when an employer
intentionally uses an unvalidated test to screen out black civil rights activists and then
singles out the less vocal black applicants for special affirmative action treatment.
315. See, e.g., I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 518 F. Supp. 800, 805-09 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 963-70 (D.D.C. 1980),
af'd, 702 F.2d 221 (1981). Prior to Teal, there was a danger that a court would rely
on unrefined labor force statistics to assess the availability of minority workers, see
infra note 317, accept the employer's bottom line defense, and erroneously conclude
that the employer's selection process had no significant disparate impact. See EEOC
v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (no beard rule for public employees
found non-discriminatory, especially since employer had higher percent of black em-
ployees in his employ than in the labor force and the general population of the area).
In such "false" bottom line cases, it may be distribution of skills and opportunities in
the labor market itself that serves to "inflate" the percentage of potential minority
applicants and the employer's apparent bottom line balance merely reflects an inaccu-
rate assessment of the numbers of minority members interested and available for
work.
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however, if the validation requirement produces a correspond-
ingly negative impact on voluntary affirmative action, cancelling
out any equality gains achieved by Teal. Although Teal did not
purport to cast doubt on the legality of voluntary affirmative ac-
tion beyond the mild constraints imposed by Weber,316 the rejec-
tion of the bottom line principle may well discourage employers
from instituting affirmative action plans to expand opportunities
for minorities. Perhaps the most appealing context for application
of the bottom line approach arises when an employer engages in
an affirmative action program that, by any measure, 317 produces a
racially and sexually balanced result. As the Supreme Court
stressed in Weber, the aims of Title VII would not be served by
placing barriers in the way of voluntary affirmative action.
31 8
Stated positively, an important incentive to voluntary affirmative
action may stem from the employer's knowledge that it might
thereby be insulated from Title VII liability, whether challenged
in a "reverse discrimination" suit 319 or in a suit brought by a mi-
nority plaintiff who failed to benefit from an affirmative action
program. 320
With respect to reverse discrimination suits, Weber broadly
316. See supra note 257 and infra note 318.
317. Several approaches may be used to measure the "availability" of minorities
to determine whether the employer has hired, promoted or otherwise selected a repre-
sentative number of minorities. Courts often rely on actual applicant flow data which
shows the results of the selection process for a group of applicants for the job. Using
actual applicant flow data, the candidates are separated into two groups: those who
are selected (e.g., hired, passed test, promoted, etc.) and those who are not selected.
The percentage of minority candidates selected from those in the applicant pool is
then compared to the comparable percentage of nonminorities selected to determine
whether the results of the selection process proportionately reflects the availability of
minorities. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at 350, 353 (Glossary).
Another approach is to construct a pool of applicants who would have applied
under conditions of normal labor supply. Particularly when actual applicant flow
data is unavailable or there is reason to believe that it is distorted or inadequate,
resort may be had to other data. Actual applicant flow data may not be helpful, for
example, because of the chilling effect of a particular selection device (e.g., a well-
publicized minimum height requirement) or because of an affirmative action recruit-
ing program. Id. at § 4.11. At times, labor force data of varying degrees of refine-
ment (e.g., limited to persons of a certain age, sex, or possessing certain qualifications)
or even general population data may be used to estimate the pool of actual applicants
that would have existed in the absence of labor supply distortions. Id. at §§ 4.2,
45.21. What is generally, or in any given case, the best measure of availability is a
controversy that has absorbed the courts and commentators. Compare D. BALDUS &
J. COLE, supra note 12, at 4.11 (preferring applicant flow data as a general matter),
with Lerner, supra note 11, at 30-32 (preferring qualified labor force statistics). See
also Rosenblum, The External Measures of Labor Supply." Recent Issues and Trends,
10 CONN. L. REV. 892, 897-99 (1978) (discussing possible inadequacies of actual ap-
plicant flow data as a measure of availability).
318. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-07.
319. See infra text accompanying notes 321-24.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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insulated affirmative action programs designed to "eliminate con-
spicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries."321 In tune with Weber, the EEOC has also taken steps to
protect the employer through adoption of its Affirmative Action
Guidelines.322 The Guidelines are of particular aid to the em-
ployer because, if the company strictly follows the Guidelines, it is
entitled to invoke the good faith reliance exemption of Section
713(b)(1) of Title VI 323 and thereby immunize the affirmative ac-
tion plan from legal challenge. The Guidelines, in turn, also take
a generous view of the instances in which voluntary affirmative
action is appropriate. Employers are permitted under the Guide-
lines to engage in affirmative action to eliminate adverse impact
caused by existing or contemplated practices, to correct the effects
of prior discriminatory practices, and to enlarge the applicant pool
of available minorities and females.324
Neither the protection of Weber nor the statutory defense of
good faith reliance on the Guidelines is available when, as in
Teal, the challenge is not to the affirmative action plan but to an-
other aspect of the selection process that operates in conjunction
with the affirmative action plan to produce an overall balanced
result. After Teal, the employer may no longer safely assume that
its affirmative action plan will serve as a defense against suits by
individual minority members. This is the case even though the
employer is protected by Weber and the Guidelines from chal-
lenges by those nonminority groups not included within the plan.
321. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209. For discussions of the legal limits placed by Weber
on affirmative action programs, see Belton, supra note 10, at 594-96; Blumrosen, 4f-
firmative Action, supra note 19, at 14-32; Boyd, supra note 134, at 18-26.
322. Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Affirmative Action Guidelines].
323. Section 713(b)(1) provides:
(b) In any action or proceding [sic] based on any alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice, no person shall be subject to any liability or punish-
ment for or on account of (1) the commission by such person of an
unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the act or
omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity with, and in
reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commis-
sion. . . . Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding that . . . after such an act or omission,
such interpretation or opinion is modified or rescinded or is determined
by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(1).
Section 1608.2 of the Affirmative Action Guidelines, supra note 322, declares that
the Guidelines constitute "a written interpretation or opinion" of the EEOC and ex-
pressly triggers the protection of Section 713(b). 29 C.F.R. § 1608.2 (1979). The pro-
tection afforded to the employer who follows the Affirmative Action Guidelines is
exceptional in that the EEOC has never before tied Section 713(b)'s save harmless
insulation to conformance with other guidelines issued by the Commission. See
Blumrosen, Affirmative Action, supra note 19, at 26-28.
324. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3 (1983).
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The key determination then becomes whether the additional in-
centive that is lost by Teal's rejection of the bottom line approach
will so dampen voluntary affirmative action efforts that the goal of
integrating minorities into the mainstream of American society
will be seriously delayed.
There can be no safe calculation of the effect of Teal on the
quantity or form of affirmative action plans. No law prevents an
employer from both validating its objective selection devices and
engaging in affirmative action. Admittedly, the bottom line de-
fense is not the only incentive to voluntary affirmative action.
Some employers engage in affirmative action to meet their obliga-
tions as government contractors under Executive Order 11246.325
Similarly, employers who use subjective or discretionary selection
devices and who are concerned about Title VII disparate treat-
ment suits may well decide to increase minority representation
through affirmative action, thus attempting to negate claims of
discriminatory intent.326 Finally, it is possible that some affirm-
ative action plans are prompted by internal company policy gen-
erated by an uncoerced desire to improve the lot of minority
workers. Insofar as the impetus for engaging in affirmative action
stems from the above sources, the employer is apt to keep its af-
firmative action program even after Teal.
Although Teal is thus unlikely to spell the end of voluntary
affirmative action, there is nevertheless reason to believe that after
Teal some significant effort that would have been devoted to af-
firmative action will be diverted to validation efforts especially
among employers who rely on objective selection devices. 327 Em-
325. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), requires government
contractors both to eliminate discrimination and to take affirmative action to correct
any underutilization (i.e., underrepresentation) of minorities or other protected
groups.
326. The Supreme Court in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),
declared that proof that an employer's work force was racially balanced or that it
contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees was not "whol-
ly irrelevant on the issue of intent." 1d. at 580. See also Stevens v. Junior College
Dist. of St. Louis, 548 F.2d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 446 F. Supp. 240, 241 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Townsend v. Exxon Co.,
U.S.A., 420 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D. Mass. 1976).
327. Even before the Court's decision in Teal, the use of tests as selection devices
was on the rise, Haney, Employment Tests and Employment Discrimination.: A Dissent-
ing Psychological Opinion, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (1982), and complaints alleging
discrimination in testing accounted for some 15 to 20 percent of the approximately
70,000 complaints filed annually with the EEOC. A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TEST-
ING 34 (1980). But see Tenopyr, The Realities of Employment Testing, 36 AM. Psy-
CHOLOGIST 1120-21 (1981), -indicating that testing by private employers is far from
universal and that when tests are used, they are generally not the sole factor in deter-
mining employment decisions. In contrast, because of the widespread use of merit
systems by government employers, Tenopyr concedes that employment testing is far
more influential in the public sector than in the private sector.
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ployers who rely heavily on objective selection procedures will
seek out methods to insulate these legally vulnerable components
of their selection process. Validation is expensive 328 and there is
no litmus test for determining whether a validity study will prove
adequate under Griggs.329 If the bottom line defense were ac-
cepted, however, the employer would have affirmative action as a
backup method to safeguard its tests should the validity studies
fail to pass judicial scrutiny. Such an employer would also have
the liberty to choose the validation method that would best serve
its business needs, without being compelled to tailor its efforts
solely to satisfy the EEOC and the courts. For example, an em-
ployer may well decide that its hiring test is economically justified
and acceptable to its employees, even though the test has not been
validated by professional, quasi-scientific standards. After Teal,
the employer with such a vulnerable selection component must
either secure sufficient evidence of validity or abandon the compo-
nent, perhaps adopting a more subjective selection process. If val-
idation is chosen, unless other incentives to affirmative action are
present, the employer may decide to give up its affirmative action
program now that the legality of its objective component will
hinge solely on the legal sufficiency of the validity study.
It is nevertheless possible that a diversified selection process,
consisting of testing and affirmative action components, might still
be perceived as a reasonable middle course for the employer after
Teal. Applicants and incumbent workers might tend to regard
328. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 103 n.60 & 181, which
recounts testimony given in 1976 by Dr. Enneis, the principal drafter of the 1970
EEOC Guidelines, stating that he was aware of only three or four criterion-related
validation studies which had met all of the EEOC guidelines and that one of these
studies cost $400,000. See also Brief of the National League of Cities and the Na-
tional Public Employer Labor Relations Association as Amici Curiae in Support of
the Petitioners at 27, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (validation is expensive
and impractical because often employers do not know whether a test has a disparate
impact until after the test has been administered); United States v. New York, 829
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 47, 69 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1979) (despite expenditure by
employer of $1,250,000 to validate test, court ruled that validation study was
inadequate).
329. It is often difficult to predict the outcome of a challenge to the validity of a
selection device because judicial assessments of the adequacy of validation studies
may be very complex. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dep't
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 630 F.2d 79, 91-106 (2d Cir. 1980) (examination
held invalid because of improper use of rank-ordering); Ensley Branch of NAACP v.
Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 816-18 (5th Cir. 1980) (criterion-related studies failed to estab-
lish validity of tests); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616
F.2d 350, 357-62 (8th Cir. 1980) (written-as opposed to practical-portion of exam
held not content valid).
The Uniform Guidelines are also very difficult for users to comprehend. The
level of reading difficulty of the Guidelines exceeds the Ph.D. level. Report by the
United States General Accounting Office, EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 5062, at
3290-91 (July 30, 1982).
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rigid quotas as unfair, yet would view a totally objective process
that screens out minorities at a high rate as insensitive to the reali-
ties of society. There is no legal impediment to the institution of
such a diversified process even after Teal, provided that the objec-
tive components of the process that carry adverse impact are vali-
dated. Once the symbiotic relationship between affirmative action
and the objective component is severed, however, it is likely that
employers will be tempted to protect their objective selection
processes by validation alone.
In addition to discouraging the more formal affirmative ac-
tion efforts by employers, rejection of the bottom line might also
serve to dissuade employers from using selection methods that
function as de facto affirmative action programs. In unusual
cases, a balanced overall result in hiring may ensue from a hiring
process that consists of components with offsetting effects on dif-
ferent groups that cannot be traced to any formal affirmative ac-
tion efforts. For example, an employer might choose employees
on the basis of two selection components-a written examination
and a veterans preference. 330 Assume that in the applicant pool
there is a higher percentage of black veterans than white veterans.
In such a case, the veterans preference might well operate to can-
cel out any adverse impact on blacks arising from their relatively
poor performance on the test. If the end result were a balanced
work force, the employer before Teal might have relied on these
results to save it the cost of validating the test in accordance with
the prevailing law.
There is justification for immunizing such employers who ex-
pand opportunities for blacks and women, even if the expansion is
not produced by a conscious affirmative action plan. Effective af-
firmative action activities may be quite casual in nature and there
may be a reluctance to label such activities as part of any con-
scious plan, lest the employer be accused of reverse discrimina-
tion. A company might be more inclined to use a fortuitously
offsetting factor, such as a veterans preference, at least if use of
such a factor does not appreciably diminish the quality of its work
force. Moreover, it is not unlikely that an employer would feel
harassed if it were required to restructure its selection processes
radically, using only validated devices, to achieve the balanced
result that it had from the outset. When the demands of equal
opportunity appear technical in nature and do not result in de-
monstrable numerical gains, the social values underlying those de-
330. See Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973),
modified, Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 493 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934 (1976) (hiring of police officers based in part on veteran's preference and written
examination).
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mands may be obscured and any attendant interference with
management prerogative will likely be received with resentment.
Without purporting to quantify the degree of harm, it is rea-
sonable to believe that Teal will discourage affirmative action.331
Unless legal and business incentives consistently favor affirmative
action, businesses are likely to be indifferent to equality objectives
and few can be counted upon on their own to regard the expan-
sion of opportunities for minorities as an objective worth pursuing
for its own sake. The evolution of disparate impact theory itself
suggests that management indifference rather than deliberate dis-
parate treatment accounts for much of what we now regard as dis-
crimination in employment. 332
If Teal does serve as a disincentive to affirmative action in
some cases, the next inquiry is whether any corresponding in-
crease in validation will compensate for such loss of employment
opportunities for minorities. One of the assumptions providing
support for proponents of validation is that the use of nondiscrim-
inatory, valid selection devices will, over time, produce a balanced
work force. 333 At first glance, the assumption seems reasonable,
grounded as it is on a belief that there are no significant, inherent
differences in talent, ability, or motivation that are distributed
along race or sex lines. It would be unrealistic to assume, how-
ever, that the long history of employment discrimination against
women and blacks will be wiped out in the next few decades sim-
331. If the bottom line focus had been sanctioned, it would have been possible to
limit Title VII disparate impact claims challenging diversified selection processes to
those centering on the validity of the affirmative action program. Only if the affirma-
tive action plan were legally vulnerable under the Weber standards, see supra note
257, would it then indirectly lose its capacity to protect the other aspects of the selec-
tion process.
332. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUB. No. 70, AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s: DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 10
(Nov. 1981):
Some practices that disadvantage minorities and women are readily ac-
cepted aspects of everyday behavior . . . .These actions, all of which
have a discriminatory impact on minorities and women, are not neces-
sarily acts of conscious prejudice. Because such actions are so often
considered part of the "normal" way of doing things, people have diffi-
culty recognizing that they are part of a discriminatory process and,
therefore, resist abandoning them despite the clearly discriminatory re-
sults. Consequently, many decisionmakers have difficulty considering,
much less accepting, nondiscriminatory alternatives that work just as
well or better to advance legitimate organizational interests, but without
systematically disadvantaging minorities and women.
See also Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise, supra note 177, at 70.
333. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20
(1977) ("[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the
racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which em-
ployees are hired.").
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ply by outlawing the use of all procedures that are not job-related
and have an adverse impact. Educational deficiencies, handicaps
produced by stereotyped attitudes, and the other legacies of a dis-
criminatory past will continue for some time to limit the ability of
certain groups to compete equally for benefits on the basis of job-
related criteria. 334 The balanced work force promised as a by-
334. See Comments of Eleanor Holmes Norton, former Chair of the EEOC, ex-
pressing the fear that validation of tests may not result in an improvement in the
status of minorities and women:
You have a situation where the largest employer in the United States
[the federal government] has managed to validate tests that have a terri-
ble adverse effect upon minorities and women. . . . Validated to be
sure according to their methodology, but it is clear that employers
around the country are increasingly sophisticated in the validation of
tests. Because employers make money and will learn to do what the
government wants them to do. And the government says what we re-
ally want you to do is validate tests, that is what they are going to spend
their money doing. And frankly, they have spent a great deal of money
doing just that, and my hat is off to the psychologists. We do not see,
however, comparable evidence that validated tests have in fact gotten
black and brown bodies, or for that matter, females into places as a
result of the validation of those tests. In other words, we do not see the
kind of casual [sic] relation that I think, when the great-and I regard it
as a great new enforcement tool was discovered some years ago, we do
not see quite the casual [sic] relationship we had expected to see.
Rather we are faced with the possible anomaly that tests could be vali-
dated and no effect or no appreciable effect flow to minorities and wo-
men, and in particular minorities, because of, perhaps, reasons more
complicated than any of us understand, going at least to class and other
background factors that militate against people who have come from
such backgrounds taking tests as well as people who have not come
from such backgrounds. ...
I think test validation gives them an A-I out. Because if you vali-
date your tests you don't have to worry about exclusion of minorities
and women any longer, you have done what it seems to me is increas-
ingly a fairly minimal thing to do given the sophistication of psycholo-
gists in coming up with validation. That leaves a whole generation
.... of, particularly black and brown people to wait, . . . until their
class status, their cultural opportunities, whatever it is that accounts for
these disparities have caught up. Unless somebody pushes employers to
find other ways other than tests to find qualified people. . . . I suppose
I confess I just don't believe very much in tests, although I understand
their utility. So that while I agree with both Commissioners on the im-
portance of maintaining test validation, I suppose I disagree on the im-
portance attached to it and in fact believe that test validation-that the
employer community has now caught on to a nice new thing, and that if
they continue to rely as heavily on validation, they could actually un-
dercut the purposes of Title VII in erecting a barrier that would then be
impenetrable. . . . I suppose I confess that I think we ought to be en-
couraging employers to look, yes, to do what they can to validate tests;
but we ought to understand that in a perfect world of validated tests, we
still leave most minorities at a disadvantage when compared with most
whites who take tests. . . . I warn us all that in the history of reform,
the great disadvantage of reformers is they stop reforming themselves
Excerpts From Transcript of EEOC Commissioners Meeting on Dec. 22, 1977,
D.L.R. (BNA) No. 43, at E-I to E-4 (Mar. 3, 1978). See also Committee on Ability
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product of validation might well take such a very long time to
emerge that generations of American workers will continue to be
subjected to the inequities of a stratified workplace. 335
Compared to validation, conscious affirmative action plans
appear better suited to achieving a balanced workplace in the rela-
tively short run.336 If a paramount objective is to achieve balance,
it seems more reasonable to embrace the bottom line focus, rather
than validation, because of the former's superior ability to spur
voluntary affirmative action efforts.
Pointing to the advantages of the bottom line focus as a de-
vice to speed up achievement of a balanced work force, of course,
does little to dispel the fear that reliance on the bottom line will
also produce the negative effect of appreciably reducing reliance
on merit selection, at least insofar as merit selection can be associ-
ated with use of validated procedures.3 37 Without discounting the
Testing, Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council,
Ability Testing: Uses, Consequences, and Controversies, Part I, at 146 (1982) (even
highly valid tests are likely to have an adverse impact on blacks and certain ethnic
minorities who continue to have a relatively high proportion of less educated and
more disadvantaged members); Schmidt & Hunter, Employment Testing-Old Theo-
ries and New Research Findings, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1128, 1131-33 (1981) (citing
recent studies indicating that lower test scores for minorities are not attributable to
test unfairness but instead reflect a societal problem that some groups of individuals
are not acquiring job-related cognitive skills to the same degree as other groups).
335. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 312, at 405 n.25 (even if
discrimination were to stop immediately, it has been estimated that it would still take
approximately seven generations for blacks and whites to have similar occupational
distributions) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination]; L. THUROW,
THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 185 (1980) (with respect to relative earnings for full-time,
full-year workers, if black males were to continue their relative progress at the pace of
the last twenty years, it would take them another sixty years to catch up with white
males).
336. One possible problem with permitting employers to choose affirmative action
rather than validation as the means of complying with Title VII is the danger that
such an affirmative action-centered hiring process will secure not only a floor of job
opportunities for minority groups but will also impose a ceiling on the number of
benefits obtained by such groups. Certainly when affirmative action results in a quota
that operates as a ceiling, it is repugnant to Title VII's objective of removing artificial
barriers to advancement of minority workers.
It seems unlikely, however, that application of the bottom line principle would
necessarily mean that minority groups would suffer from an employer-constructed
ceiling on opportunities. Rather, assessment of a bottom line balance may be keyed
sensitively to the number of interested, available persons in the work force. If em-
ployers and courts are careful not to underestimate the percentage of Title VII benefi-
ciaries who can be expected to seek work with the particular employer, see supra note
317, the bottom line focus should not take a perverse turn and function as an artificial
ceiling.
337. Cf Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Proce-
dures With Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30-32
(1977) (bottom line focus encourages employers to devise covert quota systems com-
posed of offsetting selection devices that have sufficient appearance of job-relatedness
to withstand charges of intentional discrimination).
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value of a merit-based system, however, it is important to recog-
nize that Title VII is not a fair employment procedure law that
mandates a merit system.338 Just as no employer is required
under Title VII to hire a particular person solely to achieve a
more balanced work force, no individual minority applicant, no
matter how objectively qualified, is guaranteed a job under Title
VII. Even though Title VII may encourage merit selection as an
important means to eliminate discrimination, the legislation does
not require that employees be hired on the basis of their qualifica-
tions. Proof that a selection device is job related is only required
if the challenger first establishes that the device has an adverse
impact on the minority group.339
Given that neither a merit-based system generally nor a
merit-based system secured by validation of selection devices is
mandated by Title VII, there remains the more difficult question
of whether, as a policy matter, the Court should have pronounced
validation as the preferred means of achieving the antidiscrimina-
tion guarantee of Title VII. Indeed, the bottom line debate itself
most sharply centers on this question of preference. Endorsement
of the bottom line prnciple would have enabled the employer to
choose between affirmative action and validation; in rejecting the
bottom line principle, Teal effectively limits employer choice and
commands a preference for validation.340
There is much to be said in both the short and long run for
permitting the employer to choose which compliance technique it
will use. The legislative history of Title VII discloses that a high
value should be placed on management prerogative. 341 It is fair to
assume that this deference to business stems not from some un-
thinking allegiance to pieties of the free market but from a belief
that the individual employer has the motivation and is in the best
position to decide which practices, including personnel practices,
will be most efficient and profitable.
Although there may be little dispute that, in general, merit-
based selection is good for business, there is certainly no such con-
sensus as to what constitutes the necessary qualifications for any
given job or other operational definitions of "merit". 342 Personnel
338. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 29-42, 257-58.
341. House Judiciary Committee Rep., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
150 (1963), at 29, reprintedin EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 2150; 110
Cong. Rec. 7218, reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 3015 (Comments of
Senator Clark).
342. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 312, at 432-34. For a dis-
cussion of the complexities involved in formulating a technically adequate job
description, a prerequisite of any job analysis, see R. HENDERSON, COMPENSATION
MANAGEMENT 132-67 (1979).
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specialists trained in industrial psychology may sometimes pro-
vide valuable education for the employer in matters of efficiency
by using sophisticated validation techniques to assess personnel
practices.3 43 Yet given the cost of validation efforts and the nas-
cent state of the art of validation, a reasonable employer may de-
cide not to rely on the experts but rather to experiment with
selection devices of its own choosing. It seems reasonable to en-
courage such experimentation by business so as to maximize the
chance that innovation will lead to greater productivity. 344 In one
sense, the Teal requirement of validation functions as a kind of
technological restraint on private business in attempting to
achieve the goals of Title VII. In contrast, the more result-ori-
ented bottom line principle can be viewed as a performance stan-
dard that permits business to select the methods best designed to
achieve the required performance level at the least cost.345 The
343. But see Bartholet, supra note 115, at 1009, which cautions that courts should
not uncritically accept the conclusions of testing experts. Professor Bartholet points
out that testing experts tend to be employer-oriented because they are hired by em-
ployers and are "committed to the rationality of the testing devices they are trained to
develop." Most significantly, testing experts are "technicians" whose expertise "gives
them no basis for making the value choices that determine the legality of selection
systems."
344. There is some evidence that affirmative action programs are cost efficient
methods for achieving equality of job opportunity. See Oversight Hearings on Equal
Employment Opportunity andAffirmative Action, pt 1, Before the Subcomm. on Employ-
ment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
359 (1981) (statement of J. Clay Smith, former Acting Chair, EEOC) (citing study by
Arthur Andersen and Co. that cost of affirmative action accounts for only .07 percent
of total sales of 48 companies representing more than 20 industries).
345. Performance, as compared to technological, standards have been viewed as
more desirable regulatory mechanisms in other contexts. The U.S. Regulatory Coun-
cil has reviewed the various federal agencies' attempts to institute "innovative regula-
tory techniques that depart from the rigid (command-and-control style) that
dominates most Federal regulatory programs." U.S. Regulatory Council, Memoran-
dum for the President, at 3-4 (May 30, 1980). Performance standards were classed as
one of these innovative techniques:
Performance standards are being used as alternatives to regulatory re-
quirements that specify the exact means of compliance (prescribing, for
example, exactly what technologies must be used). Agencies set general
performance levels and permit the regulated entities flexibility to find
and use the best ways of complying. Performance standards allow firms
to minimize their own costs of compliance and permit them the flex-
ibility to adapt to their particular business conditions.
Id. As examples of such recently introduced performance standards, the Council
cited as performance-oriented standards EPA's new "bubble" policy whereby plant
managers are encouraged to propose varying mixes of control for pollution sources as
long as they achieve the same overall emissions level and efforts by OSHA to examine
and rewrite its standards based on detailed specification language.
See also Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal Coal and the Clean Air Act,
89 YALE LJ. 1466, 1566 (1980) (criticizing approach of Clean Air Amendments of
1970 that prescribed particular means to reach stated antipollution objectives and en-
dorsing more ends-oriented approach whereby Congress requires an agency to define
EQUALITY UNDER TITLE VII
danger inherent in governmental imposition of a technological
standard, such as validation, is that, if such a technique proves
relatively ineffective, the legal machinery will not be able to re-
spond as quickly in devising and implementing a workable substi-
tute as could private industry.
On matters of efficiency and the related issue of what consti-
tutes merit in any given context, a strong argument can thus be
made for according employers great leeway. Profit-motivated em-
ployers have incentive to choose cost-effective procedures, includ-
ing those selection devices that will increase worker productivity.
With respect to expanding opportunities for minorities, however,
business cannot be expected to have a similar, self-interested moti-
vation to achieve that goal. To counteract employer indifference
to equality objectives, courts may be required to intervene and
dictate the use of personnel practices that will achieve equality in
the workplace.
Thus, perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the bottom
line principle is that courts ought to defer to employer choice
whenever the employer has demonstrated that it is not indifferent
to equality concerns. A good measure of an employer's concrete
concern for minority interests is the existence of a valid affirma-
tive action program that is effective enough to produce truly bal-
anced hiring or promotion results. If the presence of a bottom line
balance is regarded as evidence that the employer has accorded
significant weight to equality objectives, it then seems sensible to
defer to the employer's judgment as to the other, more efficiency-
oriented aspects of the selection process, such as personnel testing,
rather than to insist that a psychologist or other professional de-
clare each component of the process efficient.
346
In the last analysis, one's position on the merits of encourag-
ing affirmative action through use of the bottom line principle or
promoting merit selection by insistence on validation may rest on
a prediction as to the educative effect of each approach on those
who make key employment-related decisions. The validation per-
spective has the advantage of reinforcing the view that it is ulti-
mately the individual worker who matters most and that undue
reliance on group affiliation is counterproductive and unfair. Re-
liance on validation also serves to allay the tension between an
its ends aggressively but permits more leeway in agency choice of steps to reach stated
goals).
. 346. Even the Uniform Guidelines have recently been criticized as outdated. The
American Psychological Association's Committee on Psychological Tests has in-
formed the federal enforcement agencies that in its view "the Guidelines reflect a
reliance on and use of measurement theory that does not represent the current state of
research and theory in psychological testing." Report by United States General Ac-
counting Office, EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 5062, at 3288 (July 30, 1982).
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ultimate vision of Title VII as furthering an individualistic notion
of equality of opportunity and the more explicit group focus of
disparate impact theory. On the surface, at least, the validation
perspective appears neutral and purports to guarantee fair selec-
tion procedures for the benefit of individual applicants.
At the same time, rejection of the bottom line may carry a
negative educational impact that outweighs the beneficial teach-
ings of validation. Insofar as the result in Teal instructs that em-
ployers must subordinate group equality gains to the interests that
certain individuals have in merit selection, it serves to diminish
the importance of the goal of expansion of opportunities for mi-
norities as a "good" in its own right. The employer is told to be
fair and merit-oriented so as not to hurt minority workers and
applicants accidentally. But this tepid formulation of the equality
objectives under Title VII may simply serve to promote employer
indifference, an attitude that has proven particularly harmful for
minority interests. Achieving a representative work force that at
the same time places individual talent and other merit considera-
tions above group ties is not easily accomplished in today's unsta-
ble economic environment. 347 Given the enormity of the task of
ending racial and sexual stratification of the work force, the
chances of success decrease as the end of achieving a balanced
work force is pursued with less urgency and as direct efforts to-
ward that end are made to appear less respectable. From this per-
spective, Teal may be a loss for civil rights advocates.
CONCLUSION
Nearly twenty years after the enactment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, critical issues remain in achieving the
Act's overriding goal of equal employment opportunity for minor-
ities and women. Still unresolved is a tension between two con-
ceptions of equality-one individually oriented and one group-
oriented-that are linked to the two theories of employer liability
347. Ross, The Negro in the American Economy, in A. Ross, EMPLOYMENT RACE
AND POVERTY 6 (Ross & Hill eds. 1967) (the occupational progress of blacks into jobs
other than farming or domestic service has been sporadic and has halted or reversed
during periods of economic decline); L. THUROW, supra note 335, at 63-65 (1980)
(recessions negatively affect the following groups in the order of highest to lowest
number unemployed: black teenagers, women, adult blacks, Hispanics, elderly
whites, young whites, prime-age white males); Edwards, Affirmative Action or Reverse
Discrimination. The Head and Tail of Weber, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713, 717-18
(1980) ("[Dluring the periods of high unemployment which occurred between 1973
and 1979, blacks suffered worst in the employment market."). But see R. HILL, THE
ILLUSION OF BLACK PROGRESS 6 (1978) (black unemployment is no longer as respon-
sive to the state of the national economy and is transforming into a structural, or
persistent, problem).
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that have evolved under the Act through judicial and administra-
tive interpretation.
This tension surfaces with particular clarity in the bottom line
debate: the controversy concerning the degree to which employers
should be insulated from disparate impact Title VII suits when
their overall hiring or promotion processes generate a racially or
sexually representative distribution of employment benefits. The
Supreme Court's recent rejection of the bottom line principle in
Connecticut v. Teal, a disparate impact case, subordinated the
group interest in equal employment benefits to the interest of indi-
vidual Title VII beneficiaries in fair employment procedures. It
would be wrong, however, to conclude that the Court's preference
for validation amounts to a rejection of the group-oriented con-
ception of equality under Title VII. The seemingly neutral proce-
dural requirement of validation is, in fact, triggered only by a
showing of adverse impact on minorities and thus is merely one
means of protecting a group interest in equality.
When read against the Court's earlier decision in United
Steelworkers v. Weber sustaining employer-initiated voluntary af-
firmative action programs, Teal dramatically illustrates the erratic
evolution of disparate impact theory and the rationale it presup-
poses for judicial incursion on management prerogative in order
to achieve equality in employment. Most discouraging about
Teal, especially if extended as logic would suggest, is its likely
effect in diminishing legal incentives for voluntary affirmative ac-
tion. As a compliance technique under Title VII, affirmative ac-
tion is superior to validation in its capacity to produce substantive
gains in employment opportunities for minorities and women. It
would be regrettable if the demise of the bottom line principle
ultimately operated to obscure the intrinsic importance of increas-
ing employment opportunities for historically victimized groups
and to discourage creative employer choice in selecting the per-
sonnel practices that will yield a representative work force.
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